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PREFACE
My interest in what we call Southeast Asia and, in
particular, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization began
some time ago.

Part of my Naval service was spent in the

general area, but it was during the 19 59-1962 Laotian Crisis
that my professional interest was most particularly aroused.
Press reports during the period of the crisis were inconclu
sive and my curiosity concerning the diplomatic moves of our
country and its allies made me wonder what was taking place
behind the scenes.

The subsequent settlement of the crisis

raised serious questions concerning the efficacy of the
SEATO alliance that had been in effect since 1955.
In pursuit of answers to my questions I used the
standard sources of data contained in the University
library and then found it necessary to pursue more elusive
aspects on their home grounds.

Through arrangements made

with the United States State Department I was able to travel
extensively throughout some SEATO nations.

Although travel

arrangements could not be made to enter Pakistan at this
time, I was able to make a study in Malaysia, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, South Vietnam,
Thailand, Laos, India, Nepal, Lebanon, Greece, Italy, France
and Germany.

The success of the trip was due in no small

ii
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measure to the excellent cooperation that was obtained from
the embassies and missions during the course of the trip.
Of particular note was the seven days I was able to
spend in Bangkok at the SEATO Headquarters, where every aid
and courtesy was extended by the staff of the Secretariat.
His Excellency, the Honorable General Jesus Vargas, Secre
tary General of SEATO,

was most kind in letting me interview

him on three separate occasions.

These meetings with

various

officials lent deep insight into the various countries
outlooks.
I am indebted to the Chairman of the Political
Science Department at the University of Montana, Dr. Leo
Lott, to Dr. Forest L.

Grieves,and to Sally A. Vogel

served on my committee

and gave aid and comfort.

Any

conclusions presented here are, of course, my own
responsibility.

Ill
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
History has recorded the formation, and then
extinction, of many organizations that were brought
together to bring some form of security to the collective
membership.

At the heart of almost every formation of any

organization has been the expectation that the member-units
perceived that they would receive from such membership.

If,

on one hand, they failed to receive what they perceived to
be "right and proper," then membership desirability would
decline.
It is becoming increasingly obvious that SEATO,^
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, is a victim of the
disillusionment that sets in when member-units of such an
organization have failed to receive enough of those true
benefits for which they were originally organized.
Contiguity is not a critical qualitative factor in
the formation of any organization; it nevertheless can be
expected to play an important role, depending on other
factors which may or may not be in co-incidence.

While one

of the underlying premises of this study is that the

ISee Appendix B for abbreviations used in this
paper.
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dis-contiguity of the member-units Is an important factor
in what has been and is happening to SEATO,2 the major
premise is that the "out-side" issues of the SEATO members
have so dominated individual attention as to render effec
tive cooperation within the organization increasingly
impossible because of a conflict of political considerations

SEATO is at best a consultive organ, but more
importantly it requires unanimity prior to any action that
needs to be taken by the organization.

It therefore follows

that there must be some type of common thinking or likemindedness on the part of the participants if any agreement
is to be reached.

Increasingly, however, factors external

to SEATO have created a dysfunctionalism which has caused
deterioration to set in.

The national interests of the

members, on an individual basis (particularly France,
Britain and Pakistan), have been redirecting their major
focus of foreign policy away from Southeast Asia, and hence
away from SEATO.
While granting the importance of a detailed study
of the internal political structure of the individual states
which make up the SEATO body, it is necessary to confine
this discussion to a study of the interaction among some
SEATO states as they reacted to specific political events
on the international scene.

The thesis then poses the

2See Appendix A for meetings of the organization.
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3
general question as to whether or not the individual country
reactions to the specific political events examined later on
in any way contributed to the general decline in attitude
toward SEATO by those same countries.

It should be readily

recognized that a decline within the SEATO powers in regard
to country attitudes toward stated SEATO goals has set in.
The question at hand is what has been the cause or causes to
make this happen.
An overview of the past and present together is
necessary to correlate what is taking place.
phenomenon is an elusive thing.

The political

For the most part, it can

be illogical to both participants and viewers.

While the

goals of one nation or unit may "appear" to be most logical
to their intended aspirations, given the conditions of the
times, they might be quite contradictory to "naturally
assumed" allies.
Politics and people are indivisible, bringing into
focus a sum or totality of environment and conditions.

What

must be remembered is that these conditions are the handi
work of time and events, and that what occurs in the present
is the result of what has transpired in the past.
Such a truism formed the background for those units
o
and actors which came together to form SEATO.

^The terms "actor," "state," and "unit" are used
interchangeably.
The term "actor" is also used for an
individual.
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Many political developments have taken place prior
to and since the formation of SEATO.

If total precedence

were placed on "formal" political events such as confer
ences, meetings, and the like, resultant conclusions could
prove deceptive or, at the least, superficial.
The Geneva Conference preceded the Manila Confer
ence.

The Berlin Conference preceded the Geneva Conference,

and the Bermuda Conference preceded the Berlin Conference.
By themselves, these political events are important, and,
taken together, they begin to form a picture of interaction
among the various states of the Global System.

But this is

not enough to form a true analysis.
A feeling for History, as Churchill put it, is
essential.

But other ingredients and factors must also be

added to obtain as complete a picture as possible.

Events,

political ones in particular, do not just come about.
People make them, and there are forces working behind them
that cause them to act in the manner that they do.
What about the leaders or actors of these nations:
what was their background; at what stage in their political
careers were they; what were some of the motives that guided
them?
power"?

Who, individually or collectively, had "bargaining
These are questions that should be looked into.

At

the same time, it is essential that a perspective is given
to this, for much of the discussion hinges on how the sepa
rate leaders of the SEATO nations saw SEATO in relation to
how it would benefit their own particular nation.
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The Manila Conference occurred one and one half
months after the Geneva Conference, which had met primarily
to discuss the Korean and the Indo-China questions.

That

the two are interrelated should not be subject to question.
However, it does not necessarily follow that the creation
of SEATO at the Manilla Conference was a direct outgrowth
of the results of the Geneva Conference.
Causal factors emerged as a force behind this
political move on the part of the United States under the
directorship of former Secretary of State Dulles to create
SEATO.

A quick explanation of two items can perhaps best

simplify and delimit the dichotomy that was present at the
time in Washington:

the establishment of a "peaceful"

status quo, and the recognition that there was now on the
global scene a power that could upset what had supposedly
been achieved on the battlefield, "victory for democracy."
First, there was (and perhaps still remains) a
persistency on the part of the victors at the conclusion
of World War II to "create" a new world order.

Having

established some modicum of stability with their victory,
they sought a restoration of the status quo, and to give
legitimacy and "legalize" that condition, formed the
universal body of the United Nations.

In this way, the

powerful victors, having permanent seats in the Security
Council of the United Nations, could wield effective use
or control of coercive power to put down any state or
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grouping of states that sought to upset this balance now
supposedly achieved.
Second, having come to realize that it was one among
their own group of victors (the Soviet Union) that sought to
change the status quo, and it being a strong power,^ the
next "logical" step was to create some sort of force or
deterrence that would dissuade any overt challenge to the
balance of power that had been established.

To do this

would require some collective force that would be credible.
The creation of NATO,^ as a "shield" to Europe was their
answer.

This was the beginning of the general policy of

containment and encirclement which was to be followed by
SEATO and, ultimately, by the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO).
Good and necessary as this economic plan and later protec
tive shields were, it nevertheless set in motion certain
social, economic, and political forces which continue to
affect world relations.
Many observers would classify the split which exists
between East and West as ideological.

Some of those same

people would mark this split as being distinct by the end

^The Soviet Union is generally accredited with the
title of "superpower" after her acquisition of a nuclear
device (September 2 3, 1949) with credible means of delivery.
^NATO came into being April 4, 1949.
It has 15
member states:
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, West Germany.
(Greece, Turkey, and West Germany were later signatories
to the Treaty.)
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of World War II and at the beginning of the Soviet Union’s
push into Eastern Europe.
An ideology had taken root in a previously backward
country (Russia).

That society had now emerged and asserted

itself not only internally, but through ideology externally
as well.
World War I shattered empires in Europe.

World

War II shattered empires all over the globe, and colonialism
was being cast aside.

Millions of people were now forged

into newly formed states, notwithstanding the fact that many
of these newly-formed entities did not even have an indige
nous professional or college graduate within their popula
tion^ with which to make the crudest sort of a beginning of
a m o d e m political infrastructure.^

Ginis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares (3rd
rev.; New York: Random House, 196 4) , p p . 2 88 , 29 8-299 . See
also John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations:
World
Politics in Our Time (New York : Random ”House7 196 5) ,
pp. 127-129 . for an Asian view see Ayub Khan, "Pakistan
Perspective," Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII, No. 4 (July, 1950),
548.
See also Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Islam and National Inte
gration in Pakistan," Asian Political Systems:
Readings on
China, Japan, India, Pakistan, ecH Betty B. Burch and
Allan B. Cole (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.,
1968) , p. 340 .
^Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The
Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, I960), p. 11. The editors argue effec
tively that any society, no matter how primitive, has
political structure.
However, in the "competitiveness" that
exists in the Global System, one criterion for success and
achievement would be a more advanced form of political
structure with the ramifications that go along with it.
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Peoples previously held back by the superimposition
or dominance of alien cultural values (including coercive
power) now had some opportunity to readjust their newly
obtained independence with their own societal values.^
It was with this type of background that SEATO,
under the guiding hand of John Foster Dulles, American
Secretary of State, came into being.
Events, bearing directly and indirectly on the
countries uniting in SEATO, occurred rapidly.

Europe had

had its "Soviet" scare, NATO was born, the Warsaw Pact was
created, Chiang Kai-shek fled from the mainland of China
and Mao Tse-Tung was in power.

The Netherlands were in the

throes of trying to re-establish colonial control over the
Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia), and were meeting
mounting resistance in their efforts.

The French were

engrossed in the same process in Indo-China.

And finally,

the Korean War had begun, helping to some degree in the

®Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communica
t e (2nd ed.; Cambridge: HrT"Press
; pp": 3T7 T o ^HT;
191.
See also Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins,
International Relations:
The World Community in Transition
(3rd e d . ; New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1969 ),' pp. 4^8-449 ;
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace (4th e d . ; New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967),
p p , 83-86 ; A. G. K. Organski, World Politics (2nd e d . ; New
York: Alfred Knopf, 196 8), pp. 29, 189.
For an Asian view
see Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," Foreign Affairs,
XXXVIII, No. 4 (July, 1960), 548.
See also Khalid Bin
Sayeed, "Islam and National Integration in Pakistan," Asian
Political Systems:
Readings on China, Japan, India,
Pakistan, ed. Betty B. Burch and Allan B. Cole (Princeton:
Dl Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968), p. 340.
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election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United
States because of his promise to go there and bring peace.
The passage of eight years since the end of World
War II, created, in certain quarters in the United States,
an intense feeling of hostility toward the Soviet Union and
the Communist menace it was felt to represent.

The era of

"McCarthyism" was a manifestation of this attitude.9

On top

of this also lay a mixed feeling of betrayal through the
loss of mainland China to a Communist regime.

The cases of

Owen Lattimore, Alger Hiss, and Whittaker Chambers revealed
some of this feeling.
With the introduction of "Chinese volunteers" on a
massive scale into the Korean conflict against American and
allied forces, it may be easily understood why the elector
ate of the United States reacted in the anti-Chinese
(Communist) and anti-Russian fashion as it did.

John

Foster Dulles, appearing on the political and diplomatic
scene at this time, gave expression to these feelings
through an American anti-communist, foreign policy, which
met with no objection from President Eisenhower.

^Excellent accounts of this stage are given in
D. F. Flemming, The Cold War and Its Origins (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday S Company, 1961), Yol 1, pp. 331-540;
Vol. II, pp. 543-706.
See also John Lukacs, A New History
of the Cold War (3rd. e d . ; Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books,
Doubleday ê Co., 1962), pp. 58-136.
For more detailed
account of this period see chapters 21, 22, 29, 34, 38, 57,
and 70 of Dean Acheson, Present at Creation (New York:
W. W. Norton S Company, 1969 ). See also Wayne S. Cole, An
Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations (Homewood. I n . : The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 521-542 .
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Elsewhere, politics were in flux.

France, during

the continuing period of the Fourth Republic, still suffered
from domestic instability, which from 1950 to the end of
the Geneva Conference saw eight governments come and go.
In many respects, it was a tragic replay of the 19 30 's when
similar political instability marked the French Third
Republic.
England, with a semblance of stability, nevertheless
faced mounting economic problems.

Before World War II, the

English pound sterling was probably looked upon as the most
stable currency in the world and the one currency upon which
world traders pegged their transactions.

With the tremen

dous expenditures in men, material, and other resources that
World War II cost the English, the pound sterling has never
really recovered its preferred status.!*^

Since the war, two

^*^F. S. Northedge, British Foreign Policy (New York:
Frederick Praeger, 1962), ppl 33-39.
"Britain’s economic
plight at the end of World War II was extremely grave.
One
fourth of her national wealth had been used up in fighting
the war" ( 7,300 million).
On August 21, 19 45, President
Truman signed a proclamation ending lend-lease.
This put an
even heavier burden on the British:
4,200 million of
British foreign assets had been sold to help pay for arms
aid.
"Britain, a recipient of nearly two thirds of all
lend-lease was now expected to assume liability for supplies
in transit or in British hands or waiting to be delivered
under existing contracts.
The shock of this decision,
effected without consultation with the British Government,
was such that Churchill, now leader of the Opposition, said
he could not believe it was the last word of the United
States on the subject. . . . "
The result was that a loan
was arranged ( 9 30 million) with 2 per cent interest.
In
addition, Britain had to agree to terms that : she undertake
to make sterling freely convertible into other currencies
not later than twelve months after the loan agreement came
into force; not to apply quantitative restrictions
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devaluations of the pound have marked its decline.

At one

time, the Bank of England could probably have withstood any
abnormal run on the pound.

That situation no longer existed

and major stabilizing measures were brought to bear from
international sources such as the World Bank or the Inter
national Monetary Fund.

Britain’s economy was spent, and

an increased trade was necessary to gain its goal of
recovery.
For centuries England had reigned supreme as a world
power.

Two World Wars, irrespective of the fact that they

were victorious, had bled the British to the point where
they were nearly fiscally prostrate.

From the heights of

world prominence and leadership, the British now found
themselves in a very definitely lowered position with regard
to big power consultations on world affairs.

It was a

position that they were not used to.
At the same time, the vaunted Empire that England
had had, was fast disappearing as country after country
broke away to establish its independence.

A definite

decline had set in for the British that they found hard to
stop or even slow down.
discriminatingly against dollar goods, which implied that
any British restrictions on purchases from the United States
applied in order to conserve dollars would have to extend
to imports from every part of the world; consented to enter
into negotiations with countries holding British sterling
liabilities with a view either to scaling them down or
refunding them; from the American point of view this would
have the effect of diverting to the dollar market the
import demands of countries holding sterling balances which
they might otherwise liquidate by purchases in Britain.
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If anything, the Suez adventure of 19 56 (which will
be fully discussed later) could be viewed as a last desper
ate attempt on the part of the British to re-instate them
selves as a world power with which to be reckoned.
As is to be pointed out. United States' reaction to
this British move, along with the French and Israelis, came
as a shock to the British.

This was further compounded

by the manner in which the United States treated British
interests in the United Nations in obtaining a cease-fire
and subsequent withdrawal of combatant forces from the
canal area.

A British "dream" of the "Imperial Lifeline"

was broken for all time to come.

What had been a British

bastion in South Asia and the Far East was long gone.

Now,

the symbolic link itself was irretrievably broken.
The closing of the Berlin Conference (January 25February 19, 1954) in which the United States, Soviet Union,
France, and Great Britain participated, brought with it
the decision to set up a meeting of states at Geneva to
work out details for a general peace in Korea.

Communist

China (over the objections of Dulles) was made party to
the conference^ which also was to deal with the Indo-China
situation.
The Berlin Conference had been concerned mainly with
European issues--NATO pressures on the Soviet Union, German

^^Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Cambridge: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1960), p p . 84, 99.
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reunification, and the European Defense Community ( E D O .
Here, there was some disagreement among the allies.

France

was under pressure from both Britain and the United States
to implement the EDO so that there could be a greater
"military solidarity" against any "potential" aggressor.
France was hesitant as it was a desire of the French leaders
to maintain a military superiority over the West German
nation.
At the Geneva Conference (April 26-July 21, 1954),
the differences that were beginning to appear among the
allies showed themselves to an even greater degree.
Dulles had begun to sound out various powers
concerning a form of collective defense arrangement for the
Far East.

But his timing was bad, and he was being opposed

by the B r i t i s h . T h e main British view was that any
formation of a "bloc" of defense in Southeast Asia should
await developments at Geneva so as not to compromise the
talks.
There was an incongruity about these events, for
although the American position was to set up some type of
defense in Southeast Asia against the Communist enemy,
China, the allied (this refers mainly to Britain, France,

^^Britain, still remaining with her policy of
contact with the Commonwealth, had found that Nehru was
adamantly opposed to the formation of any type of bloc
arrangement in Southeast Asia.
See Northedge, op. cit.,
p. 30.
See also John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles
(New York: Harper S Bros., 19 5 7), pp. 210-211.
See also
"Did U.S. Almost Get Into War?" U.S. News and World
Report, June 19, 1954, pp. 35-39.
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and the United States) unity which was essential for the
success of any type of venture such as this, was being
severely tested upon strictly European questions.

X3

The

"allied" position could not have appeared more futile.
At Geneva, the end came quickly for the French.
Dien Bien Phu fell during the conference, and the Laniel
Government collaped.

Pierre Mendes-France, the new French

Premier, stated that he would end the stalemate at Geneva
in one month or resign.

The impasse was broken, and a

cease-fire agreement with subsequent new alignments of the
Indo-China states was made.
The United States, free of commitments at Geneva,
now concentrated on the establishment of what was to become
SEATO.

The invited states met at Manila to fashion the

details for this new bulwark against Communism.
were Australia, France, Great Britain,

New

Present

Zealand, Pakistan,

the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States.

The SEATO

Treaty and corresponding Pacific Charter were the result of
this Manila Conference.

That result was a "consultive"

agreement.
l^Tang Tsou, "The American Political Tradition and
the American Image of Chinese Communism," Political Science
Quarterly, LXXVÏI (December, 1962), 5 7 1 - 5 See also
Bernard Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (New York: J. B.
Lippincott Company, 19 66), pp. 461-462.
See also "Why
Diplomats Are in Trouble," U.S. News 6 World Report, May 21,
1954, pp. 25-38.
^^The United States did not sign the Geneva Agree
ments, but instead. General Walter Bedell Smith, Under
Secretary of State, made an oral declaration that the United
States would adhere in principle to these agreements.
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SEATO should be looked at in the overall perspective
of the general political questions that were then dominant,
and not in the false light of being a new entity in the
Asian area, or even of being the "final" pact that finished
the encircling containment of Communism in Eurasia.
The gathering of these diverse states into SEATO was
a crude amalgamation--Dulles' attempt to complete some kind
of a "containment" of the Communist menace that he saw.
That Communism was expanding depends on one’s frame of
reference.

Dulles’ grouping together of these states, in

addition to being a mistake in timing, was also a miscalcu
lation of the nature of the units he brought together.
There can be no denial that at least in Australia
and New Zealand such a "breakaway" move from dependency on
Britain to closer association with the United States was
welcomed.

SEATO could be viewed as the culmination of the

"Pacific Defense Fact" that Dulles had envisioned during
the negotiations on the Japanese Peace Treaty.
some ways complementary to the ANZUS Treaty.

It was in
As Leicester C.

Webb, writing in SEATO: Six Studies, points out repeatedly,
Australia and New Zealand were far from satisfied in the
roles that their countries had previously played in the
overall British picture of Empire defense.

In the two

great wars, Australian and New Zealand troops had been taken

^^Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy:
The
ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (New York: University
Press, 1969), p . 66.
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from the Pacific area and transferred to the European and/or
Middle Eastern area.

The defeat of British forces in Hong

Kong, Malaya, and Singapore during World War II by the
Japanese and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the
Repulse— the main strength of the British fleet in the Ear
East— brought home the fact to Australia and New Zealand
that they had to find some type of arrangement that would
give them a better security arrangement than they had had
f^reviously within the British Commonwealth.
Î

Britain was opposed initially to the creation of

the ANZUS pact.

When she later tried to gain membership on

at least an observer basis, the application was rejected.^®
But even this turn of events should not be taken at face

^®Leicester Webb, "Australia and SEATO," SEATO;
Six
Studies, ed. George Modelski (Melbourne, Australia! F. W.
Cheshire), p. 55.
"In the British House of Commons Winston
Churchill, answering Labor attacks, said that he ’inherited
a certain situation’ but that he had ’never concealed the
fact’ that he regretted the manner in which the ANZUS Pact
had developed. . . . At the time the pact was signed the
British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, told the House
of Commons that ’it would not have been unwelcome to us if
we had been included in the proposed pact,’ but that it was
quite clear that the discussions would not work out this
way. . . . Between 22 and 2 6 September, 1952 military repre
sentatives of the parties of the Pact met in Honolulu and at
the same time the United Kingdom let it be known that a
request that British observers should attend the meetings
had been rejected.
For this decision the Australian and New
Zealand governments were strongly attacked in Parliament and
the Press.
Both governments refused to disclose whether the
exclusion of the United Kingdom had been at the instance of
the United States and emphasized that the decision had been
unanimous.
In this connection it seems that main instiga
tion came from the American Government." See Acheson, o p .
cit., p p . 6 86-6 88.
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value as a full satisfaction of Australian and New Zealand
desires.

So far, no governmental references are available

indicating whether or not the ANZUS pact actually repre
sented a quid pro quo for the signing of the Japanese Peace
Treaty with which they were displeased.
The Australians, New Zealanders, and Filipinos could
be expected to go along with an American direction that
would place emphasis in the Pacific area.

However, even in

the case of the Philippines, there was some reluctance to
enter into such a collective pact as can be noted in this
interview with Philippine President Magsaysay :
INTERVIEWER;
Communism may not be a great menace in
the Philippines now, but isn't it a danger elsewhere
in Asia, and hence a threat to the Philippines?
Do
you think there is any need for a Pacific defense
pact, possibly modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization?
MAGSAYSAY:
Right now, it is difficult for us to enter
into any such alliance because we have our own problems
here, and they are difficult to solve. We have home
work to do. Our house is leaking very badly.
If we
don’t repair our house, the Communists would not need
an invasion force to capture the Philippines ; we would
simply go under because of our weaknesses.
Unless we
do something about land tenancy--if there is corruption
in the government, if we can’t give our people three
square meals a day, shelter and a piece of land— then
we'll wake up some morning and find that the Communists
have taken over.
It w o n ’t be an army coming from the
Chinese mainland either, but our own hard core Commu
nists capitalizing on our failures. . . . Of course I
am interested and always have been interested in the
security of the Pacific, because that directly affects
us. I feel, however, that it is important that we
first attend to our own problems before anything else.
Anyway, most of us have mutual-defense pacts with the
United States, and each of us can contribute our share
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to the security of the Pacific by complying with our
obligations under those pacts.
Britain and France, on the other hand, were less
interested in the Pacific area.

Britain still had her base

in Singapore and had un ders t an dings with Malaya, Borneo,
Brunei, Sarawak, and was, within the Commonwealth, committed
to Australia and New Zealand.
Although the problem of colonialism in North Africa
was beginning to trouble the French, the chief problems as
they saw it remained in Europe.

EDO was at the same time a

political, military, and economic problem that threatened
allied solidarity.

German rearmament without restrictions

was anathema to the French.

The high stakes involved in

being a world power meant that both Britain and France must
belong to the "nuclear" club.

The problem, though, was the

cost involved.
There was little meaning in France joining SEATO.
A French presence in Southeast Asia after Dien Ben Phu could
now be only on an economic level.

Militarily, the French

Army had had staggering losses, "the cream of its regular
officers dead or crippled, the rest of them embittered
and thinking little else but applying upon their own country

^’^"Driving the Communists Out of the Philippines,"
an Interview with Ramon Magsaysay. President of the Philip
pines, U.S. News S World Report, April 23, 1954, pp. 72-78.
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the same revolutionary-warfare methods as the Viet-Minh had
used upon them.
The plight in which both Laniel and Mendes-France
found themselves at Geneva was humiliating.

Another

"diplomatic" setting in Manila would not remove this blow
which had befallen France.

Perhaps Bernard Fall says it

best;
And Bidault, like France herself, stood there alone.
The delegations of the three little Indo-Chinese
states of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam were of little
help at this juncture.
The British Foreign Secretary,
Anthony Eden, was the co-chairman (with Russia) of
the conference and, in view of Britain’s role in the
Indo-China conflict during the recent weeks, barely
on speaking terms with his French colleague. As for
the United States delegation, the Secretary of State,
in one of his repeated confusions between the appear
ance and reality of American prestige, had preferred
to return to the United States and leave the American
delegation in the capable but less prestigious hands
of his Under Secretary, General Walter Bedell Smith.
Bidault was reported to have said to an associate that
he had come to Geneva with "a two of clubs and a three
of diamonds" as his only diplomatic cards.
As he
looked around him before he began to speak, at his
fellow Western diplomats and their embarrassedly down
cast eyes and at the Communist diplomats staring at
him unblinkingly, he was the very picture of France’s
loneliness in her defeat.19
The United States was the chief architect of the
Manila Conference (SEATO), and Thailand was perhaps the only
power attending that was fully in accord with United States’
wishes.

But even the Thais did not obtain what they really

1 ^Bernard B . Fall, The Two Viet-Nams:
A Political
and Military Analysis (New York : Frederick A. Praeger,
T9'6 3)7 p.' 22 T.
19 Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pp. H23-H2H.
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wanted.

For SEATO become (Article IV of the Treaty,

Appendix C) a "consultive" body, and not the NATO-like
structure that the Thais wanted.
forces assigned to SEATO.

There were no defense

For the Pakistanis, SEATO

represented an association with a "military" alignment that
would somehow offset the insecurity they felt with regard
to India.
The Brecher Concept
The trials and tribulations of SEATO may be some
what explainable if viewed in the framework of Michael
Brecher's theory of Dominant v. Sub-dominant systems.

In

this context, then, the treaty area of SEATO actually
becomes subsidiary to the more internal concerns of the
various powers of SEATO.
This does not mean that a base cause of SEATO
troubles does not in reality stem from the ideological
conflict that exists between the United States and the
Soviet Union.

A causal determinant might be closer to the

truth of the situation if it can be determined what direc
tion the individual nations are taking, and whether that
direction is, if not coincidental, at least not in major
conflict with the stated goals of SEATO.
If we can accept Michael Brecher's view, and at
this point of time there would seem to be much validity in
it, then it should be assumed for purposes of analytical
probing that the concept of a "rivalry" or conflict between
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the various systems does in fact exist and serves as a base
motive for other factors which appear on the international
scene.
If we can

assume that this has some basis in fact,

then we must look

at this base problem in a longer time

continuum (longer

in fact than the

ence).

If then such a "yardstick"

15 years of SEATO exist
is used, we can perhaps

see the more basic and complex problem emerging that in
reality is masked over by moves in other quarters.
While the base problem is not the focal point of
this paper, it nonetheless serves as a primary factor when
considering the way the power makeup of SEATO and its
"environmental" fluctuation fits in when the actions of the
individual powers or participants are viewed.
There are many demands which are both implicit and
explicit in the maneuverings of the states which are going
on at present.

If we can use both the struggle between

East and West and the evolution of the Brecher theory as
a somewhat liberal frame of reference, then we can perhaps
better understand the moves which are taking place within
the entity that is SEATO.
Professor Brecher in an article on Southern Asia
makes the point that there are five definable Subordinate
Systems in the world--Southern Asian, Middle Eastern,
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American, West European, and West African.^0

At the same

time he postulates that there is a superior Dominant System
which is made up of the two superpowers.

A further defi

nition of levels is made within the Subordinate Systems,
indicating some strengths and weaknesses of the various
members.

It is within this "structure" that the action and

interaction of the various members of the systems, both
Dominant and Subordinate, take place.
If Brecher's concept of the "Southern Asia system"
is accepted, it then follows that his further definition
of the makeup of that system must also be used:
(1) its scope is delimited, with primary stress on a
geographic region; (2) there are at least three actors;
(3) taken together, they are objectively recognized by
other actors as constituting a distinctive community,
region, or segment of the Global system; (4) the mem
bers identify themselves as such; (5) the units of power
are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant System,
using a sliding scale of power in both; and (6) changes
in the Dominant System have a greater effect on the
Subordinate system than the reverse.21
Just as the sub-systems are different according to
their own particularistic^, so too are the nations and
actors that make up the sub-systems.

Determinants of power

(as A. F. K. Organski describes it) or elements of power
(as Hans J. Morgenthau describes it) can be important when
trying to make an evaluation of the moves and counter-moves
^^Michael Erecher, "The Subordinate State System
of Southern Asia," International Politics and Foreign
Policy, ed. James
Rosenau (Rev. e d . ; New York: The Free
Press, 1969), p. 156.
21lbid. , p. 157.
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that the nations make.

Geography, national resources,

industrial capacity, population, national character, nation
al morale, quality of government— all of these go into the
complex makeup of the societies and cultures that in turn
creates the nation-state, which combined with other con
tiguous counterparts, makes up the sub-system. 22
It is highly useful, and even necessary, to under
stand these individual differences between the varied states
that make up SEATO.

Such tools or determinants as these

Political Scientists use are meaningful, for if used pro
perly, they can give a perspective to the sometimes blurred
international picture.

It is from these basic sources that

most goals of the nation-states are evolved.
The argument here is that, from the beginning of
SEATO, there were two mis judgments, one at the subordinate
level, the other at the sub-system level.

The subordinate

error was that Britain and France, although client units of
the Dominant System, were nonetheless primary members of
the West European System.

In this case, the West European

System and Dominant System were on divergent courses rather
than coincidental paths.

The sub-system error was that

there were serious miscalculations in all four steps of the
unifying force concept (see page 35), the most serious being
in the recognition of the need for unity and in the rewards

22Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace (4th e 3 . ; New York: Alfred
Knopf, 196 7), pp. 106-143; and A. F. K. Organski, World
Politics (2nd ed.: New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968), pp. 87-189
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for grouping.

It is a major contention that the organiza

tion has never surmounted these two distinct and vital
misj udgments.
The United States serves as the chief elite of the
Dominant System.

(In the Global-Subordinate Systems, the

Dominant System is classified in the Bipolar sense.)
Because of its superior military might (in nuclear capa
bility, manpower, and technology) the United States found
itself as the seemingly unquestioned leader of what was then
termed the "Free World."

The aftermath of the war saw both

Britain and France prostrate from the expenditure of resources
to gain victory.

Only the Soviet Union stood as a potential

challenger to American leadership.

With startling sudden

ness political developments occurred that took the shape of
a confrontation between East and West blocs:
a.

The establishment of Communist governments in East
Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary,
Yugoslavia ;

b.

Soviet pressure in Iran;

c.

The Berlin blockade; and

d.

"Sovietization" of the Czech government.
American response was quick and was launched by the

now famous Truman Doctrine.

The Marshall Plan, which was

designed to rehabilitate the European economy, quickly
followed.

Under General Lucious Clay, the Berlin airlift

soon blunted the blockade that had been imposed.

American

pressure, plus Iranian adroitness, facilitated a Russian
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withdrawal from the northern territories of Iran.

And the

final reaction to the problems of the East was the estab
lishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which
an attack on one was considered an attack upon all.

The

counter-reaction to this move was the creation of the Warsaw
Pact on May 14,

19 5

5.23

These events gave impetus to the creation of the
Bipolarity (or Dominant System) that has since dominated
the international scene.

This does not mean that Bipolarity

was a result of these political happenings.

Bipolarity had

as its cause many deeper roots, of which the political
occurrences were merely symptomatic, or manifestations, of
underlying forces.

A discussion of causal factors in the

creation of Bipolarity would be the subject for a paper in
itself.

Pertinent to the present problem is the fact that

Bipolarity was established, hence creating some of the
conditions that are operative today.
It is a premise here that because of the total
resource capabilities of Britain and France (both

2 Wa r s a w Pact members are : Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and
the Soviet Union.
2^R. N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and
the Future," International Politics:
Introductory Readings,
ed. George S. Masannat and^GiIbert Abcariah TNew York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), pp. 212-213.
See also
Stoessinger, op. cit., p. 175.
For further discussion,
see Morgenthau, o p . cit., pp. 335-337, and Organski, o p .
cit. , pp. 364-367.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26
member-units of the West European System) that these nations
act as elite lieutenants^^ in relation to SEATO.

They are

in a "superior" position to that of other members of the
organization who would be classified as mere members, or
client units.

Another distinction that would further remove

Britain and France from the role of clients within the SEATO
framework is their geographic position.

Theoretically,

because of their total removal from the defined territorial
area that comes under SEATO protection, they can only con
tribute some form of allocated resources rather than receive
some type of reward function.
The Subordinate Systems of West Europe and America
are antecedent to those of West Africa, Middle Eastern, and
Southern Asia.

In addition they normally have deeper roots

through their contiguity than does the Dominant System, or
sub-systems, which for the most part are more subject to
variables in their creation.

This does not mean that con

tiguity is a prime factor in the creation of a Subordinate
System.

The great number of wars in Europe, for example,

argue against that.

However, the factor of contiguity in

association with ethnoculturism can lend a force of
equilibrium that will more clearly define an area such as
a Subordinate System.

9S

Etzioni, o p . cit., pp. 45, 329. Here the term
"elite lieutenant" is substituted for "member-elite" with
essentially the same meaning as the author uses.
It is
felt that the term "lieutenant" will more clearly mark the
distinguishing feature of levels.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27
The West African, Middle Eastern, and Southern
Asian Subordinate Systems in relation to their potential
are still in an embryonic stage, due not only to the compara
tive newness of their formation but also to the fact that
the majority of the under-developed and developing nations
in the world (micro and otherwise) are located in these
three systems.
Considerations for this paper deal mainly with the
Dominant, West European, and Southern Asian Systems with the
SEATO units being grouped accordingly:
DOMINANT SYSTEM
United States
WEST EUROPEAN
United Kingdom
France

SOUTHERN ASIA
Pakistan
Thailand
Philippines

(Members of the Global System, Australia, and New
Zealand do not fit into a definable Subordinate
System as yet.)
World War II (as any other major conflagration) left
its indelible scar upon the levels of European society.

By

far the greatest political effect that the war had was a
shifting of the center of balance of international political
decision-making away from the European capitols to Washing
ton and Moscow.

While this had a tendency to diminish the

^^An important element in consideration of these new
systems is that they are the product of colonialism that has
just been cast off.
Political Scientists will have much to
work with in charting the progress of these many and varied
states and the eventual systems that they gravitate toward.
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power of the E u r o p e a n s i t has in no way diminished the
West European System from ranking much higher than the
other subordinate systems in terms of power resource.
The history of Europe has been the story of a
struggle for primacy on the continent.

There are a multi

tude of reasons for struggles by some and passiveness by
others.

Resource capabilities, ambitions, both national

and personal, have played their role in shaping the moves
that the various nations have made.

To the surprise of

noone, some form of this struggle is still taking place on
the continent, but now it is more economical than political.
For example, the colonial empires of Britain and
France served as one point of rivalry between these two
states.

Now that they no longer control vast empires, their

rivalry must now be on the European continent.

This took

form with the European Economic Community (EEC) created
January 1, 195 8, consisting of Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany.

Such a

"union" of European states, being exclusive, meant that here
was a potential economic force that must be matched or at

^^In this sense, Europe is meant as the major
countries of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany who
had previously dominated the continent for such a long
period.
(This may be somewhat of a contradiction to Henry
Kissinger; I include Germany. While it may not have all
of the attributes or determinants of a "Great Power," it
nonetheless was a powerful political factor that had to be,
and still has to be, considered.)
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least checked, for the vital area of trade and general
economy is of utmost concern to any modern power.
Under the leadership of Britain, the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) was created on January 4, 1960, in
response to the "Common Market."

EFTA (or "the outer

seven") consists of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
While it may be true that these two sub-systems are
rivals of each other, it does not lessen the structure or
diminish the West European Subordinate System.

But it does

point up the rivalry that exists.
The Southern Asia Subordinate System consists of
Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Nepal, North Vietnam, Pakistan, the Philippines, South
Vietnam, and Thailand.^ ^

For geographical and political

reasons, mainland China is omitted from this subcontinent
archipelago description.
The area and unit membership of this System are
extremely important to SEATO if only for the reason that the
defined territorial limits of the organization are located
within this area.
Diversity of background was a distinct yet underly
ing factor at Manila.

In a broad sense, here was a combin

ing of elements of two Subordinate Systems, a Dominant
System, and elements close to a Subordinate System.

^^Brecher, op. cit., p. 157.
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United States represents the Dominant System.

Britain and

France are members of the West European System, as well as
being client units of the Dominant System.

Pakistan, the

Philippines, and Thailand belong to the Southern Asia
System, while Australia and New Zealand, belonging to no
system, are attached to the Southern Asia System geographi
cally, while culturally, ethnically, and economically still
attempting to retain ties with the West European System.
Territorial contiguity need not be a critical factor
in determining the success or failure of any type of multi
state organization.

However, when dis-contiguity is added

to other determinants which, for the most part, are hetero
geneous rather than homogeneous, it can then be anticipated
that such an organizational formation has serious problems
to cope with.
Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines form part
of SEATO.

Both Pakistan and the Philippines gained their

freedom after having had some form of colonial past.
Thailand, on the other hand, is the only Southern Asian
state never to have suffered colonial domination.
Territorially, and from the standpoint of popula
tion, Pakistan is the largest of the three units of the
Subordinate System.

Notwithstanding this fact, Pakistan

suffers from tremendous problems in its nation-building
process, that in certain aspects, places it behind its
smaller counterparts.

Karl W. Deutsch ranks Pakistan sixth,

the Philippines 17th, and Thailand 19th in a rank order of
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what he terms human needs.

In his rank order of potential

power, he ranks Pakistan 2 7th, with the Philippines follow
ing in 3 8th, and Thailand, 45th.

His ranking in the

indicator used for human welfare finds the Philippines 87th,
Thailand 93rd, and Pakistan 1 0 6 t h . T h e s e ,

of course, are

not the only indices in any nation-building process, but
they do serve as an indicator of some of the problems that
go into that process.
The newness of Pakistan as a nation is not the least
of the problems that are pertinent here.

Pakistan, like

India, gained its independence (partition in 1947) on a
mainly religious basis.

(Pakistan is predominantly Moslem;

India is mostly Hindu.)
The division of the sub-continent into the states of
Pakistan and India was bloody at the onset, and the animos
ity engendered from this traumatic birth continues.

The

latest manifestation of this was the 1965 Indo-Pakistani
clash in the Jammu-Kashmir dispute.

Peculiar to the general

nation-state system is the example of Pakistan being geo
graphically split.

The economic-communication network in

a developing country is a problem, but it is immensely
compounded when there is a geographic barrier placed in
the way.

It is further compounded when the political

Karl W. Deutsch, o p . cit., pp. 252-270.
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factors of non-cooperation of the geographic barrier
(India) are added.^0
Adding to the weighty problems of Pakistan is the
internal schism of the Bengali, or East Pakistan area.
Whether or not an inability to cope with the problem was a
factor in Ayub Khan's decision to step down is at this
point conjectural.

But this factor must be taken into

consideration when making an assessment of the internal
political makeup of today’s Pakistan.
Thailand, like Pakistan, is a contiguous part of the
Asian mainland.

Unlike Pakistan, however, Thailand has had

a long history of nationhood and no colonial domination.
Politically, Thailand is still in a transitory
period.

The coup in 19 32 removed the absolutism of the

Royal family.

Since that time, various factions of the

military oligarchy have ruled Thailand, the latest being
headed by Field Marshal Thanon Kittikachom (Prime Minister)

^^In population, Pakistan is outnumbered on an
approximate 4 to 1 ratio with India.
See Khalid B. Sayeed,
The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co. , 196 7), pp. l85'-2'll. See also Norman D. Palmer and
Howard C. Perkins, International Relations: The World
Community in Transition (3rd e d . ; Boston; Sougîïton Mifflin,
19 69) , p7 52.
^^The general concept for the "division of labor"
is a good example here in Pakistan, for one of the chief
criticisms of Rawalpindi by the East Pakistani is that they
are being exploited by the West Pakistani.
See Deutsch,
op. cit., p . 30.
32ihailand during World War II did have a form of
Japanese occupation during the Pridi regime.
A measure of
autonomy was retained during this period.
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King Bhumiphol Adulyadej, of the House of Chakri, is
the ninth monarch to ascend the throne.

qq

The Royal House

is a recognized symbol of unity in this kingdom.

The pres

ent King and his wife, through their Westernized upbringing
and subsequent trips throughout the world, have helped
considerably in popularizing Thailand.

Internally, the

Royal family has also been much more involved with the Thai
public than had previously been the case.
The Thais, though able to maintain their indepen
dence through the general period of European colonialism in
t%e eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nevertheless have
/
had conflict on a more local basis.
There have been wars
with the neighboring Burmese, Lao, and Khmers (Cambodians)
over the centuries.

Boundary shifts and animosity have been

the results which still persist today.

3U

The Philippines, since the close of World War II and
the gaining of independence from the United States, have
been in a constant state of nation-building.

The United

3 3King Bhumiphol became King following the strange
shooting death of his brother. King Ananda Mahidol, in June,
1946.
The Coronation was held in May 5, 1950. Thailand:
Facts and Figures (Bangkok, Thailand:
Department of Techni
cal and Economic Cooperation, 198 7). See also Valentin Chu,
Thailand Today (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1968). Informa
tion was also supplied in several conversations with the
Thai Ambassador to the United States, H. E. Bunchana
Atthakor.
3‘+"Thailand: Holder of the Kingdom, Strength of the
Land,*’ Time, May 2 7, 1966 , pp. 2 8-34.
See also ”Thailand :
A Fighting Ally for U.S. in Asia," U.S. News S World Report,
February 27, 196 7, pp. 46-4 8.
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States, like Britain, had been a "gentle" master as regards
building up the island-nation to the time when it would
receive its freedom.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that the

Philippines has chronic economic problems that bring with it
political overtones.

The Philippines, even though it does

enjoy a high standard of living in comparison with other
Asian states, still remains in the class of a "developing"
nation.
Philippine politics, mercurial at best, chaotic
otherwise, is a product of the same socio-political system
that it must stabilize in order to bring some kind of
solution to the vast economic problems which face the
country.

The prevalence of a high incidence of graft and

corruption on both the governmental and non-governmental
levels does not lend itself to needed reforms which must
come if stability (at least on the political level) is to
come about.
The Philippines, like Thailand, and Pakistan, are
in a transitional stage (in the case of Pakistan and the
Philippines, they must, almost, be categorized as developing
nations).

There are a multitude of internal problems

S^Alden Cutshall, The Philippines: Nation of
Islands (Princeton:
D. Van Nostrand,1964), pp. 46-5 0 ,
6 8-9Û. See also George S. Taylor, The Philippines and the
United States: Problems of Partnership (New York: Prederick
ÂI Praeger, 19 64), pp. 134-14^.
Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade
in Asia: Philippine Victory (New York: John Day,19 55),
pp. 60, 91-93, 201-205, 232, 2 34.
Carlos P. Romulo, I
Walked With Heroes (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
1961), pp. 95, 322-324.
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besetting these nations, which when weighed against external
demands of other powers often affect the decision that these
nations make in regard to those demands.

Therefore, careful

attention should be given to these internal political
forces.
If a failure on the part of American diplomats to
recognize these problems was not a factor in the formative
stage of SEATO, then, certainly, it has become one now.
Failure now, on the part of American diplomats, to alter
American hopes as regards SEATO in light of these problems,
will do further damage to that body.
Whenever states come together to fashion some type
of unifying force, be it an alliance, pact, treaty, or
understanding, prerequisites for the success of such a
venture dictate that certain minimal conditions should be
met.

Usually there are at least four implicit factors.

First is the unifying or common purpose factor.

Some form

of credible or tangible evidence of benefit should be
available to the intended units.

A problem should be

clearly recognizable and accepted as such on the part of
all the units.

Additionally within this acceptance by the

member units is the willingness to contribute an individual
allocation of resources to meet the agreed-upon goals of
such a force.

(The individual unit believes that there will

be no conflict or interference with previously committed
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internal and/or external functions.)

The Second factor

is the identive one^G which includes cultural as well as
ideological patterns of similarity.

The third is the factor

of resource development and availability.^^
factor is the promise of rewards.

The fourth

Any grouping or amalga

mation must have with it some sort of incentive or reward
function that will fulfill the expectancy of any single
unit.

This can take the form of a number of results, be

they material or non-material.
The situation studies following are intended to show
that, in particular, reward functions did not materialize in
a number of instances, systems being in conflict, resource
development on the part of some of the member-units was not
activated or put to good use; and to a lesser, but still
important degree, the recognizable problem that should have
united all member units (military and political threat) was
not in itself fully accepted by all members of the body.
There are three situational studies used in this
paper to demonstrate the premise of the thesis.

These are

political events which occurred and had direct relationships

^^Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification (New York :
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 3T. This is
close to his usage though not as broad in meaning. Almond
and Coleman, op. cit., p. 33. The term identive would have
close association with the idea of interest articulation.
^^This is more socio-economic oriented, including
the vital stage of technological/industrial development,
i.e., material/mineral availability, a definite managerial
competency sector, facilities for basic research, some
degree of wealth.
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with various members of SEATO.

They are also occurrences

which, by their very nature, had profound effects on
internal processes of those member-units and, in the opinion
of the author, an adverse effect.
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Chapter 2
SUEZ CRISIS
The Suez crisis took place two years after the
formation of SEATO.

Its location was thousands of miles

distant from the Treaty territory, yet is important in the
study of SEATO in that it involved the three elites of
SEATO— Britain, France, and the United States.

It involved,

in other terms, a "conflict" between the Dominant System
and units of a Subordinate System, and to a lesser degree
another sub-system--NATO.
While the leadership in the United States was the
same at the time of Suez as when SEATO was formed, in
Britain, the then Foreign Secretary under Winston Churchill
was now the Prime Minister; and in France, Guy Mollet, a
Minister to Mendes-France, was now Premier.

Relatively,

then, the same participants were involved.
There were divided interests.

Britain saw the

takeover of Suez by Nasser as a direct threat, both economi
cally and politically.

The French saw Nasser’s action as a

further threat to Algeria, its remaining colony in North
Africa.

The United States, on the other hand, viewed the

reactions of their allies as endangering the U.S. policy
of bettering relations with the Arab states.

(Arab feeling

38
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against the United States in view of withdrawal of promised
aid in building the High Aswan Dam was strong.)

Not at any

time since the formation of SEATO or afterward had such an
issue so openly split the three elite states.
At this time also the beginnings of British with
drawal in the area of Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore
was making itself felt.

In 19 51, the ANZUS Pact was con

cluded between Australia, New Zealand and the United States
with the British left out completely.
In 1956, the British saw to their dismay the United
States acting in a manner that they perceived to be quite
opposite to their own basic national interest, the safe
guarding of the once regarded "Imperial Lifeline."
Karl Deutsch's point on the formation of foreign
policy certainly applied to the British at this time.

He

states that "The foreign policy of every country deals first
with the preservation of its independence and security, and
second with the pursuit and protection of its economic
interests (particularly those of its most influential
interest groups).
By 19 51, Britain had given up nearly all vestiges of
the colonialist trappings of imperialism.

Only a few out

posts of Crown Colonies were left of that former, glorious
Empire that in the Nineteenth Century caused the remark:

iKarl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International
Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1968), p. 87.
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"We hold a Vaster Empire than has been."^

That which

remained of what had been the Empire was now transformed
into the larger and more autonomous Commonwealth or had
broken off into independent nations cut off from all ties
to the former mother country.
This reduction of empire, irresistible as it may
have been what with the pressure of peoples for an inde
pendent status, had not come about without objections on
the part of the British hierarchy^ or a reduction in
British power and prestige on the world scene.

Empires

often have the attribute of "dying hard," and it was,
perhaps, no different with the British Empire than it had
been with other empires.

Whether viewed from the point

of vested industrial interests in Britain, that saw the
units of the Empire as a steady source of materials and
profit, or in a purely nostalgic sense, those "elites"

^Statement on a Canadian stamp of 189 8 in reference
to the British Empire.
^Winston Churchill on one occasion remarked that
"I did not become the King's First Minister to see the
dissolution of the Empire." John Bartlett, Familiar
Quotations (14th ed. ; Boston: Little, Brown ê Co., 196 8),
p. 9T4.
^While it is recognized that those peoples who
severed ties as colonies did so mostly under peaceful
conditions, as opposed to the French example of Algeria
and Indo-China, the point is valid that a considerable
amount of British public opinion did not wish to see this
change come about.
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or leaders of the government viewed this cutting of ties
with great reluctance.^
It should not he surprising, therefore, that Suez,
the very "symbol" of British power and prestige in their
prime, should produce this strong reaction on the part of
the British elite segment.

The nationalization of the Canal

by Egyptian President Camel Abdel Nasser was anathema to
Anthony Eden.

It should never be forgotten that Eden took

great pride in having been a participant in the signing of
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of

19

36 .^

Suez had for years represented the "Imperial life
line" to British holdings in the Far East, especially
India, and much British blood had been shed in the defense
of the Suez Canal.

Aden, on the Southern entryway to Suez,

still remained a link to the past, while the oil-rich Arab
principalities of Q 'tar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the Trucial
states represented an investment of millions of pounds to
British interests, and had to be protected.
The relationship of Suez to the British might be
equated to Panama's relationship to the United States.

It

is conjectural what the United States reaction would be if
there should be a threat to the Panama Canal.

Dulles and

Eisenhower, therefore, should have been more perceptive in

^A majority of lands and peoples dissolved ties with
the Crown under the Labor Government of Clement Attlee.
^Eden, op. cit., p. 24 8.
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anticipating that the British would not be in any sort of a
bargaining mood while Suez was at stake.

Unless the action

were pro-British anything Dulles and Eisenhower did, however
much in the name of "peace,” would continue to widen the
gulf between the leaders of the two countries.
The American view concerning the growing tension of
Suez was conveyed in several letters that President Eisen
hower forwarded to Prime Minister Eden:
From the moment that Nasser announced nationalization
of the Suez Canal Company, my thoughts have been con
stantly with you.
Grave problems are placed before
both our governments, although for each of us they
naturally differ in type and character. Until this
morning, I was happy to feel that we were approaching
decisions as to applicable procedures somewhat along
parallel lines, even though there were, as would be
expected, important differences as to details.
But
early this morning I received the messages, communi
cated to me through Murphy from you and Harold Mac
millan, telling me on a most secret basis of your
decision to employ force without delay or attempting
any immediate and less drastic steps. . . . For my
part, I cannot over-emphasize the strength of my
conviction that some method must be attempted before
action such as you contemplate should be undertaken.
. . . I have given you my own personal conviction,
as well as that of my associates, as to the unwisdom
even of contemplating the use of military force at
this moment.7
Momentous political developments were taking shape during
that year.

The Suez Crisis, the Hungarian uprising and the

American Presidential election were all to fall approxi
mately at the same time period and were to have their
global ramifications.

Eisenhower had informed Eden of his

^Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961
(Garden City: Doubleday S Company, Inc., 196 5), p . 6T4.
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reservations on the use of force, and his general lack of
enthusiasm for any precipitate British action which he felt
o

would not be backed by American public opinion.
Further developments in the crisis caused Eisenhower
to write again to Eden:
I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point onward our
views on this situation will diverge.
As to the use
of force or the threat of force at this juncture, I
continue to feel as I expressed myself in the letter
Foster carried to you some two weeks ago. Even now
military preparations and civilian evacuation exposed
to public view seem to be solidifying support for
Nasser which has been shaky in many important quarters.
I regard it as indispensible that if we are to proceed
solidly together to the solution of this problem,
public opinion in our several countries must be over
whelming in its support.
I must tell you frankly that
American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of
using force, particularly when it does not seem that
every possible peaceful means of protecting our vital
interests have been exhausted without result. More
over, I gravely doubt we could here secure Congressional
authority even for lesser support measures for which
you might have to look to us.
I really do not see how a successful result could be
achieved by forcible means.
The use of force would,
it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy.
This letter was dated September 2, 1956, while the
date of the former letter was July 21, 1956.
increased diplomatic activity.

There was

Dulles, on orders from

Eisenhower, journeyed to London and Geneva to convey to the
allies the American position.

Eisenhower in a letter of

Bibid.
9%bid., p. 667.
lOSeal, op. cit., pp. 265-271.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44
September 8, 1956, was again to reinforce Dulles by direct
communication to Eden:
Whenever, on any international question, I find myself
differing even slightly from you, I feel a deep compul
sion to re-examine my position instantly and carefully.
But permit me to suggest that when you use phrases in
connection with the Suez Affair, like "ignoble end to
our long history" in describing the possible future of
your great country, you are making of Nasser a much more
important figure than he is.
We have a grave problem confronting us in Nasser’s
reckless adventure with the Canal, and I do not differ
from you in your estimate of his intentions and pur
poses. The place where weapparently do not agree is
on the probable effects in the Arab world of the various
possible reactions by the Western World. . . . H
A later communication, on October 30, 1956, more
clearly defined the gulf that existed between the American
position and that of Britain and France:
When on Monday actual military moves began, we quickly
decided that the matter had to
go immediately to the
United Nations, in view of our Agreement of M a y , 1950,
subscribed to by our three governments.
Last evening our Ambassador to the United Nations met
with your Ambassador, Pierson Dixon, to request him to
join us in presenting the case to the United Nations
this morning. We were astonished to find that he was
completely unsympathetic, stating frankly that his
government would not agree to any action whatsoever to
be taken against Israel. He further argued that the
tri-partite statement of May, 1950, was ancient history
and without current validity.
Without arguing the point as to whether or not the
tri-partite statement is or should be outmoded, I feel
very seriously that whenever any agreement or pact of
this kind is in spirit renounced by one of its

^^Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 669.
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signatories, it is only fair that the other
signatories should be notified. . .
Besides the distinct differences that each of the
Allied leaders felt concerning the situation, there also
existed a difference in what each of them felt was the
actual reasons for the stand that they took,^^
one thing was clear:

At least

there was not going to be any recog

nition by the United States of the tremendous stakes that
the British felt were involved with Suez.

It was a form

of "Pax Americana" coming into the open.
The Suez crisis was muddied.
no doubt.

Of that there can be

If one views the proceedings strictly from the

point of Anglo-American cooperation on the world scene,
it was a disaster.

However, another element, the personal

relationships of the individuals involved, should be
examined.

There was a decided animosity between Dulles

and Eden; this even took the form of the British leaders

l^Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York:
Atheneum, 196 3), pp. 212-217. Hughes records Eisenhower
making several remarks concerning the allied powers :
". . . ‘Damn it, the French, they’re just egging the
Israeli on— hoping somehow to get out of their own North
African troubles.
Damn it, they sat right there in those
chairs three years ago, and we tried to tell them they
would repeat Indochina all over again in North Africa.
And
they said, "Oh, no I That's part of metropolitan France
And all that damn nonsense. . . . (of British action)
I
just can't believe it, . . . 1 can't believe they would be
so stupid as to invite on themselves all the Arab hostility
to Israel. . . . (in terms of British relations with Wash
ington) Are they going to dare us— dare us— to defend the
Tri-partite declaration?'"
13 Ibid., p. 219 .
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suggesting to Washington that Dulles not be appointed
Secretary of State.
Sometimes there is a fine line that separates the
"objectivity" of policy making from the personalities of
those involved in making the decisions.

While it would be

unwise to state that the "seeming" uncooperative attitude
on the part of American leaders was due to this form of
personality conflict, this clash of minds should be kept in
focus as events continued.
How the British felt had been indicated by Eden on
as early an occasion as a speech in January, 1952, delivered
at Columbia University:
The American and British people should each understand
the strong points in the other’s national character.
If you drive a nation to adopt procedures which run
counter to its instincts, you weaken and may destroy
the motive force of its actions.
This is something
that you would not do— to an ally on whose effective
cooperation we depend. . . .1^
Eden, not without self vanity, had taken over the
Prime Ministership at a time when his party was being sub
jected to continual criticism from the Laborites (the Tories
had defeated the Labor Government four years previously).
Following the footsteps of so giant a British leader as
Churchill was no easy task for anyone.

In addition, he was

facing strong criticism from elements within his own party
for "appeasement."1^
1‘^Northedge , o p . cit. , p. 19 0.
15Anthony Sampson, Macmillan:
A Study in Ambiguity
(Harmon dsworth, England: C. JNiicholls & Company, Ltd. 7 l^&ü).
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Eden was to reveal the depth of the differences that
separated his government from that of the United States in
his memoirs :
The course of the Suez Canal crisis was decided by the
American attitude toward it. If the United States
Government approached this issue in the spirit of an
ally, they would have done everything in their power,
short of the use of force, to support the nations whose
economic security depended upon the freedom of passage
through the Suez Canal. They would have closely planned
their policies with their allies and held stoutly to the
decisions arrived at. They would have insisted on
restoring international authority in order to insulate
the canal from the policies of one country.
It is now
clear that this was never the attitude of the United
States Government.
Rather did they try to gain time,
coast along over difficulties as they arose and impro
vise policies, each following on the failure of its
immediate predecessor.
None of these was geared to the
longterm purpose of serving a joint c a u s e . I6

p. 117.
"The case of Eden, with some help from hindsight,
is more explicable.
By early 1956, after only a few months
as Prime Minister, Eden was facing ugly Tory discontent;
he was accused of weak government by the Daily Telegraph;
he was infuriating his colleagues with his fussiness and
interferences; and, more dangerous— in spite of his old
fame as an anti-appeaser— he was coming under heavy fire
for appeasing both the Russians (over Indo-China) and the
Arabs.
It was a time heavy with humiliation for the Con
servative right wing, particularly in the Middle East. The
arch-enemy was Nasser, who seemed atthat time to many people
in both parties to be part of a great Russian plot to sweep
into the Persian Gulf and Africa. Eden was very vulnerable
to criticism.
It was he who had negotiated the 'scuttle'
(as Churchill called it) from the Suez base in 1954— with
the help of Selwyn Lloyd— and who assured the Tories that
Nasser could be trusted." See also ^ dispatch, Argus
Leader (Sioux Falls), August 2, 1956, p. 1. Eden accuses
Nasser of "broken faith and broken promises."
l^Eden, op. cit., p. 512.
See also ^ dispatch,
Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), August 3, 19 56, p. 1. "Dulles
flew home from London— hopes that the issue can be settled.
A conference of the states involved is being called in
about two weeks to discuss the problem." See also AP
dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), August 4, 1 9 5 ^
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If ever a diplomat, statesman, elite, government
leader gave an example to fit the words of Deutsch in his
foreign policy description, it was Anthony Eden.

Here he

described his attitude not only toward the leadership in
the United States, which he felt had turned away from him,
but also toward the crisis that he felt that his nation
faced.

It was upon this perception that the British

leadership acted, in concert with French

leadership.

Suez represented then an issue that the British
considered vital to their national interests.

When the

issue was brought before the Security Council of the United
Nations, the British used their veto for the first time in
direct opposition to an American-sponsored resolution.

p. 1. Quoting Dulles:
"Some people had advocated immediate
forcible action— such action would have violated UN prin
ciples, led to the spread of violence and endangered world
peace."
l^Eden, op. cit., p. 485.
". . . Pineau now
declared that his Government were unanimous in desiring
urgent and decisive action. The Suez Canal had been built
by the French. Moreover, the repercussions of Nasser's
actions touched France closely in another and vital sphere.
From the first. Pineau emphasized the effects that it would
have in Algeria and upon the entire French position in North
Africa.
If Egypt were allowed to succeed in grabbing the
Canal, the Algerian nationalists would take fresh heart.
They would also look to Egypt for backing, which they would
certainly receive, both in arms and clamor.
France could
not permit this threat to develop. We agreed with
M. Pineau's forecast and supported his views. . . . "
IBpden, in Full Circle, chronicles the events within
the UN regarding the Suez crisis.
In his description of the
vote within the Security Council to transfer the subject to
the General Assembly he declared that the crucial seventh
vote necessary to pass the resolution was cast by the
United States. He fails to take into account the fact that
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United States actions seemed to disregard British
concern over the issue.

Where British leadership had felt

that at worst the American attitude would have been one of
pained indifference, the actual pressures, diplomatic and
otherwise, that the Americans used on the British, French,
and Israelis proved to be a rude shock.

Such tactics as

stipulating a cease-fire on the part of the British prior
to an American loan to ease the run on the pound sterling
did not for instance set well.

The placement of American

warships of the Sixth Fleet to act as an "accidental"
barrier to British and French fleet operations added to the
overall picture of non-cooperation on the part of the United
States.
Where the issue is held to be as vital as the Eden
government viewed it to be, then it is inevitable that the
American reaction to this affair served to humiliate the
British and thus strain the relationship that existed
between the two governments.

The same strain was also felt

by the French, for they perceived that they had just as
high a stake in the Suez affair as did the British.

Nationalist China (casting a similar vote) might not have
done so if Britain had not recognized mainland China
previously.
Sampson, op. cit., pp. 118-124.
See also Hugh
Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper 8 Row, 1966), pp. 144-146.
See also AP dispatch Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), October 31,
1956, p. 1. The United States Sixth Fleet was helping in
the evacuation of United States citizens. Units of the
fleet moved to the Mediterranean ports of Egypt and Israel.
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"Nasserism" was an idea that was beginning to take hold, not
only in the Middle East, but North Africa as well.

Anything

that stirred Arab nationalism was anathema to the French,
for nationalism was the very thing that could weaken and
even destroy their hold on Algeria as well as spelling
trouble for their economic return to the areas of Lebanon
and Syria.
In terms of alliances, the Suez crisis produced the
event of the United States, ally of Great Britain and France
in NATO and SEATO, working against her own allies to side
with the raison d'etre of these alliances, the Soviet
Union.
The more nation-states are involved in external
interests, i.e., other systems, alliances, etc., the more
varied or broader must be their scope.

Purely nationalistic

interests serve to narrow one’s room for maneuvering; for
what one nation perceives to be a necessary goal that must
be pursued, some other nation may view as something to be
opposed— it being in conflict with its own perceived inter
ests.

If such a conflict of interest exists, and the two

or more nations are joined in a system or alliance, then,
depending on how strong the motivations are for continuing
these courses, that system or alliance must inevitably
suffer at the expense of the nationalistic interest.
The Suez Affair cannot be postulated as "the"
reason for the differences that now separate some of the
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member-units of SEATO.

But it is important.

Fundamental

to any of these situational crises is the ever-present
aspect of how those member-units view the ideological
conflict between the Dominant System and the "menace" of
Communist aggression; the "demands" that each Subordinate
System extracts from its own membership as a "price" for
primacy within that system, and the ever-present competition
with each other that some of the member-units find them
selves in.
The Suez Affair may be viewed in this context.
While the bonds that had bound Britain, France, and the
United States together for so long a time may not have been
severed over this quarrel, it nonetheless must be looked at
in the sense that a gap had been made to which other differ
ences of opinion and policy could only help widen.
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Chapter 3
LAOTIAN CRISIS
The Laotian conflict of 1959-1962 provides further
insight into these differences that divided the thinking
of the elites of SEATO.

Not only is it important from that

aspect, it was highly relevant to the whole idea of SEATO,
for here was a conflict situation existing right in the
defined Treaty area.

It should also be taken into account

that Laos was in fact a Protocol State, and therefore had
a direct linkage with SEATO, as well as being geographically
within the Treaty area.
There was trouble in Laos as the 50’s ended and the
60’s began.

The government in Vientienne was clearly trying

to prevent a collapse of order in the government-controlled
portions of the country.
entity.

The Pathet-Lao was an observable

North Vietnamese forces were operating in Laotian

territory and the United States and the Soviet Union once
again were involved as Superpowers interested in an area
they each considered vital.

In the background Peking, now

at ideological odds with Moscow, was giving aid to Hanoi.
On March 27, 1961, the SEATO Council of Ministers
convened the seventh SEATO Council meeting in Bangkok.

Its

communique, issued March 29, 1961, is interesting for what
52
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is said about Laos, but more interesting for what it failed
to mention.
The resolution contained in the first part of the
communique (in particular paragraph six) was expressed in
strong language.

Indeed, this resolution, and the communi

que issued at the special meeting of the Council of
Ministers in Washington, B.C., September 26, 1959,^ were
the strongest statements ever issued by the SEATO organi
zation about a development within its treaty area.
What was not revealed in the communique was the lack
of unanimity for action within the council.

Because of this

division of opinion, the organization could take no steps.
In particular, timing and/or reluctance on the part of the
British delegation, headed by Sir Alec Douglas Home, pre
vented any actional unanimity.

Britain, as Co-chairman of

the previous Geneva Convention (the Geneva Conference of
April 26, 1954, through July 21, 19 54, the Soviet Union
being the other Co-chairman), was awaiting a reply from the
Soviet Union about an appeal to be directed mainly at Hanoi

SEATO," Select Documents on International Affairs:
No. 8 (Canberra, Australia: Queen’s Printer, Department of
External Affairs, June, 1966), p. 47.
"Considering that the
situation in Laos is one which might endanger the peace of
the area, members of SEATO will continue to consult under
the Manila Pact on measures which should be taken for the
common defense.
In the event of its becoming necessary to
defend the integrity of Laos against outside intervention,
SEATO has made preparations so as to be able to act promptly
within the framework of the Manila Treaty."
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for a cease fire in Laos.

As they had earlier stalled

formation of SEATO until after the Geneva Conference, the
British once again deferred action that might compromise
or sabotage the response they hoped to receive from the
Soviets.
The French, under the delegation leader M. Maurice
Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs, were just
as resolved not to become involved, fearing entanglement in
another Indo-China war.^
The American position at this time was far from
secure.

John F. Kennedy had taken over the presidency in

January, 1961, and was still setting up his administration.
On April 17, 1961, Cuban refugees (with clandestine American
help) attempted an ill-fated invasion in the Bay of Pigs
with the hope of toppling Fidel Castro from power.

It

failed two days after the President made the decision not
to intervene militarily.

Kennedy had inherited a growing

American concern over Laos from the Eisenhower administra
tion.

Theodore Sorensen recalls:

" 'Whatever's going to

happen in Laos,' the President-elect said to me in Palm
Beach,

'an American invasion, a Communist victory or what

ever, I wish it would happen before we take over and get
blamed for i t .'"^
^Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos : The Politics
of Neutralization (New Yorkl Frederick A. Praeger, 19 6 40,
p"I 1‘9 5'. Also see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York:
Harper S Row, 1965), p. 644.
^Ibid., p. 640.
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When one refers to the "Laotian crisis," it is
almost necessary to ask, "Which one?"

Since the ending of

World War II, Laos had seen almost constant strife, with
only intermittent periods of peace.
If the strife in Laos can be grouped into phases,
then the first phase of conflict arose from the French
attempt to re-impose mastery over its former colonies in
Indo-China.

A period of nine years marked by strife

followed before the French, bowing to the inevitable,
withdrew as a colonial power from this part of the world.^
Resistance, in whatever form it takes, can breed
new groupings and attitudes that are far different from
those which generated the conflict.

This is dependent on

(1) how homogenous or heterogenous such groups are at the
beginning, and (2) the point on the "development scale" of
the various entities or societies.

The latter point carries

the implicit question of the state of advancement of their
political infrastructures.

Resistance can also harden or

rigidify previously soft or fluid positions.

The reaction

to the attempted French imposition did just this for the
various peoples in the Indo-China peninsula.

Where pre

viously some sort of higher role than a French protectorate
or territory might have met political demands, such a
solution was soon inadequate.

When the French, in a

^Results of the 195M- Geneva Conference.
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desperate attempt to forestall calamity, sought such a
political "incorporation," it was then too late, for the
nationalist groupings which the resistance had spawned
wanted nothing less than complete independence.

Foremost

among these nationalist groups was the Vietminh under the
leadership of Ho Chi Minh.^
In Laos, the three Princes, Souvanna Phouma,
Souphanouvong, and Boun Oum na Champassak, and the King,
Sisavang Vong, represented the ruling group.

The King,

however, held little actual power and served mainly in
the role of a national symbol or unifying figure.

Laos,

although small in population, is far from a homogenous
society.

It is fragmented by ethnic and religious

divisions.
Racially, the country is composed of Lao, Kha, Meo,
Black, White, and Red Tais, and to a lesser degree by Moi,
Thais, Khmers, Mans, and Lolos.®

There is a relationship

between the Lao and the Thais (Siamese) and the Shans of
Burma.

During the past centuries, warfare between the Lao

^D. F. Fleming, op. cit., pp. 661, 667-673.
See
also Bernard S. Morris, International Communism and American
Policy (New York : Atherton Press, ÏÉ 66), p p . 99-10 0 ; and
Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, o p . cit., pp. 60-78j and Michael
Field, The Prevailing Wind: Witness in Indo-China (London:
Methuen 8 Company, Ltd., 1965), pp. 36l6 7, 41-42.
^Dommen, op. cit., pp. 3-5, and Field, op. cit.,
pp. 30-322

.
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and their neighbors dominated the fortunes of the then
small Kingdom of Luang Prabang.

(Luang Prabang, now the

Royal capitol of modern-day Laos, is a province and received
its name from the Buddha which was placed in the main
temple— "Town of the Golden Buddha").?
The original Kingdom of Lan Xang broke up into the
smaller kingdoms of Luang Prabang, Vietienne, Champassak,
Xieng Khousang and lesser states.

The kingdoms of Luang

Prabang, Vietienne, and Champassak survived the feudalistic
struggle.
In contemporary times, it is the Kingdom of Luang
Prabang that warred with the Thais and the Vietnamese, and
to some degree with the Burmese; Vientienne and Champassak
with the Vietnamese kingdom of Annam; and Champassak with
the Khmers (Cambodians).

The people are divided almost
Û

equally between Buddhism and Animism.
Souvanna Phouma and his half brother Souphanouvong
represent the Royal House of Vientienne.
sents the Royal House of Champassak.

Boun Oum repre

To a large degree,

the polarizing of the ambitions of Princes Souphanouvong
and Boun Oum triggered the second phase of the Laotian
strife.

In place of a united front against the French, that

front was fragmented into the usual trial of several

^Ibid., p . 6.
^Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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contestants for internal control.

It could be said that

this was the Laos of old in a new setting.
The people in the Indo-China peninsula exhibit great
complexity and diversity.

Quiet and peaceful as the

Laotians are, it would be a mistake to assume that in the
latter part of the Twentieth Century the various societies
with the Lao country and outside of it have plateaued or
reached any equilibrium.

Change is still taking place.

It

was against this background that the locale of Laos was
brought into the general resistance picture by the Vietminh.^
Ho Chi Minh and General Giap did not achieve the
final liberation that they had fought for and sought at the
conference table in Geneva in 1954.

With Ngo Dinh Diem

(former Premier, and then President of South Vietnam) con
solidating his hold within South Vietnam, it was inevitable
that pressure would be placed on the Saigon regime.

To meet

logistical requirements it was necessary that the narrow
confines of the seventeenth parallel be broached.

The

easiest way to accomplish this was to go westward into the
central regions of Laos.

The Ho Chi Minh Trail was created

to funnel supplies and men s o u t h w a r d . T h e Pathet-Lao,
9ln this sense the term "Vietminh" is used to de
note all of the followers of Ho Chi Minh and all movements
within the general national liberation organization.
I'^Rober Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of
Foreign Policy in the Administration of John P. Kennedy
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1967), pp. 119-120.
And see Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., p. 318.
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supported by both regulars and irregulars from North
Vietnam, used the Northern Lao territories of Phong Saly
and Sam Neua as a grouping or staging area.

From here it

was fairly simple to move westward and southward against
Royalist forces.
While the existence and use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
was clearly a breach of the Geneva accords, neither Laos,
South Vietnam, nor the United States (after August 4, 1964)
ever used this violation as a pretext to make a military
movement against it.

Only movements in the north of Laos

occasioned the recognition that violations of the Geneva
accords were taking place against the Royalist regime.
Military recognition was also given to the fact that should
the combined forces of the Pathet-Lao and the North Viet
namese so choose, they could very easily overrun all of
Laos.
Souphanouvong is generally credited with being the
leader of the Pathet-Lao.

While the Pathet-Lao are gener

ally Lao people, it was the foreign addition of the North
Vietnamese's far superior forces that triggered the denun
ciations from Vietienne.
In trying to reach some accommodations with all
f a c t i o n s , a g r e e m e n t s were worked out whereby the various
llHilsman, op. cit. , p. 91.

i

2

^

p. 131.

^ % e r e , for the sake of simplicity (and also in
accordance with most other writers), Souphanouvong and the
Pathet-Lao are labeled "leftist," Souvanna Phouma, "neutral
ist," and Boun Oum and his followers, "rightist."
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ministries of the Government were divided among the rival
parties.

Usually this would work for a period of time and

then break down when one rival felt he did not have a key
ministry.

Then instability would occur with the jockeying

of the various military sides.
over.

Territory would be fought

In the northern area of Laos this would usually be

for the strategic Plaines de Jares.^^
For two reasons this was an intolerable situation.
First, if pro-Communist forces were to take over Laos, then
the Communist frontier would be moved right to the boundary
of Thailand.

This the Thais were determined would not

happen.Secondly,
to make itself felt.

a chain-reaction effect was starting
With the increased tempo of military

activity in South Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh and the increasing
activity of forces in Northern Laos, the United States was
beginning to take more of an interest in the area.

Both the

Soviet Union and Red China were supporting Hanoi in its bid
to "drive the imperialists out."

However, the Soviet Union

and Red China had now come to ideological loggerheads, and
each was trying to outdo the other in its support of

A? dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), January 2,
1961, p. 1. ". . . Boun Oum announces that Communist forces
advanced on Laos' strategic plains--creating a threat to
the Royal seat at Luang Prabang and the Administrative
capital."
l^Bangkok dispatch, Manchester Guardian, December 29,
1960, p. 5, col. 2.
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national liberation fronts.

It was a battle to see who

would emerge as the leader of the Communist forces in the
world.

Such a struggle inevitably led to increased Russian

support of Pathet-Lao forces.

This then represented a

threat to the United States, which, since 19 51, had mutual
defense arrangements with the protocol states.
The United States under the Eisenhower administra
tion had invested much money and aid in Laos.

The situa

tion in Laos was deteriorating militarily, and with increased
pressure from the Thais, the United States made several
warnings concerning United States interest in the continued
sovereignty of Laos.

The activity of the Pathet-Lao and

its supporters had been on the increase since 1959.

Now,

with Washington, Moscow, and Peking involved also, the
situation quickly spread into an international rather than
a local situation.
Rightist forces under Prince Boun Oum succeeded in
gaining control of the government.

Since they represented

the anti-Communist faction of the country. United States

^®The American Almanac:
Dunlap, 19 70 ), p . 791.

19 70 (New York: Grosset S

^^AP dispatch, John Hightower, Argus Leader (Sioux
Falls), January 1, 1961, p. 1. "A statement approved by
President Eisenhower sharply warned Red China and North
Vietnam against armed intervention in Laos. . . . The United
States is committed by Treaty to help meet the common dan
ger ’in event of aggression in Southeast Asia.'" See also
U.S. Superintendent of Documents, Public Papers of the Presi
dents of the United States:
Dwight D. Eisenhower 196Q-l96l~
(Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 196l),
pp. 626, 641.
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support gravitated toward their side.

The fact that Boun

Oum did not have the internal support militarily and
politically to stay in power necessitated a later shift in
American p o l i c y . T h i s

did not detract from the fact that

the Pathet-Lao and its supporters were making increasing
incursions into what was considered to be governmentcontrolled territories.

The result was a call from the

United States to the SEATO powers.
The British reaction to the Laotian crisis was to
re-establish its neutral stance and to seek a cease fire
that would hopefully halt further

i n c u r s i o n s .

20

i^There was considerable political fluctuation,
including the "revolt" of Captain, later Colonel, Kong Lae.
This followed the period of instability of Prince Somsanith.
^^AP dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), Janu
ary 2, 1961, p. 1. "In another diplomatic step the United
States called for a meeting of the 8-nation South East Asia
Treaty Organization Council to discuss the crisis.
The
Council meets in Bangkok, Thailand and instructions for the
meeting went to U. Alexis Johnson, American envoy there. The
State Department also said Sunday 'We have further instructed
our Ambassadors to all SEATO capitals to inform their gov
ernments to which they are accredited of these new develop
ments in Laos and to explain the United States view that
these actions warrant considerations by the SEATO Council.
We have begun preliminary consultations with some of our
allies here in Washington.' Under Secretary of State Liv
ingston Merchant conferred with British Ambassador
Sir Harold Caccia and with Claude Lebel, the ranking
French diplomat there."
2^ManChester Guardian, December 22, 1960, p. 3,
col. 4 g pi 5^ col. Ti
"On Monday the Foreign Secretary and
Lord Privy Seal made it clear that it was the British Gov
ernment's hope that a broadly based government could be
formed in Laos including all political leaders ready to
cooperate. The British Ambassador was instructed to convey
this view to Prince Boun Oum."
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The members of SEATO received few answers to ques
tions of United States intentions at this time, for the
Kennedy administration was just taking over after eight
years of the Eisenhower administration.

It was not really

known just what moves the new President would make, nor,
at the beginning of the year, who his Secretary of State
would be.

There would be further time needed for the new

President to get used to his presidency.

At one time during

the early part of the Kennedy administration, it was sug
gested that a moratorium of six months be asked of the
Soviets so that the new President could adjust to the new
s i t u a t i o n . H o w e v e r , political movements do not wait on
American Presidents and situations had to be reviewed and
decisions made.
Boun Oum's position deteriorated as his military
forces, under the leadership of General Phoumi Nosovan, fell
back steadily under the pressure of Pathet-Lao and North
Vietnamese forces.

At one time these forces were reported

a mere twenty-two miles from the Royal capitol of Luang
Prabang.

The American alignment with Boun Oum was in

jeopardy.
Pathet-Lao and North Vietnamese forces were being
openly supplied by Soviet air-lifted supplies in the Sara
Neua-Plaines de Jares-Phong Saly area, while American

21Sorensen, op. cit., pp. 291-292.
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air-lifted supplies were reaching the Laotians in the
Southern area.

The commitment of both the United States

and the Soviet Union in Laos was soon to become obvious to
all.
President Kennedy, on March 23, 1961, four days
before the opening of the SEATO meeting in Bangkok, held a
news conference in Washington, where he outlined his
Laotian position.

In the conference he made public his

reliance on the SEATO organization:
SEATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization— was
organized in 1954, with strong leadership from our
last administration, and all members of SEATO have
undertaken special treaty responsibilities towards
an aggression in Laos.
No one should doubt our resolution on this point.
We are faced with a clear and one-sided threat of a
change in the internationally agreed upon position
of Laos. This threat runs counter to the will of
the Laotian people, who wish only to be independent
and neutral.
It is posed rather by the military
operations of internal dissident elements directed
from outside the country. This is what must end if
peace is to be achieved in South East A s i a . 22
That reliance, as it turned out, was not met to the fullest
degree by the entire membership of SEATO.
Whereas the United States had been placing its
support behind the "legal"

93

government of Prince Boun Oum,

2 2u.S. Superintendent of Documents, Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States : John F T Kennedy, 196r~
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 214,
^^In his takeover of power, Boun Oum and General
Nosavan had ousted Kong Lae, who then went over to Prince
Souphanouvong and his followers.
Pressure was placed on
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Britain and France had given at least tacit support to
Prince Souvanna Phouma, who was now no longer in the country.
The remaining political leadership was the polarized
factions of Boun Oum and Souphanouvong.

The military for

tunes of General Phoumi continued to slip, and it was
becoming increasingly evident that Prince Boun Oum and his
General could not hold out much longer against the mounting
pressures of the Pathet-Lao and the North Vietnamese.
To hold as much as they could of Laos for neutral
territory, the West opted for an international conference
on Laos after a cease fire had been called for and achieved.
The Communist powers, to gain more territory and consolidate
gains already made, held off for as long as possible in
answering this call for a cease fire.
But the "front" that President Kennedy had tried to
put forth in his statement of March 2 3 failed to hold.

This

became evident in the language of paragraph four of the
SEATO Resolution of March 29:

"It is believed that these

results ought to be achieved through negotiations and

the King to recognize the Boun Oum regime as the legitimate
regime, which he did. Just prior to that, Prince Souvanna
Phouma had tried to form a government of "national unity"
which would include all political factions. General Nosavan
would have had the post of the Ministry of Defense, but he
failed to take up that position. The Boun Oum move followed,
and Prince Souvanna Phouma left the country for Cambodia.
2‘+Field, o p . cit. , pp. 125-126 .
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cannot be hoped for if the present fighting continues.
It was only after this issuance of the SEATO communique that
the Soviets answered the Aide Mémoire of March 2 3 that the
British had sent them requesting a cease fire in the name
of the co-chairman of the previous Geneva Conference.
Divisions had prevailed within SEATO.

The United

States had to shift from the earlier position of energetic
ally supporting Laos as a pro-Western bastion.

Now the

United States had to back a Laos that would be neutral
without ties with the West.
Politically, this move was a necessity.

To have

done otherwise would have meant that a unilateral United
States response, in the form of full military support, would
be mounted to prevent a complete takeover of Laos by the
Communists.

The new President did not choose to follow this

course, and an International Conference on Laos was convened
in Geneva on May 16, 1961.
From a standpoint of SEATO, the "Laotian Crisis"
served to undermine the very base of the organization.

25s EATO Communique of March 29, 1961, Annex C to
SCM/61/VT, p. 125.
^^The conference was originally scheduled for
May 12, but the question of who was to represent Laos from
the three factions delayed the opening. This conference
lasted from May, 1961, to July 23, 1962, and subsequent
events in Laos (the renewal of fighting and violation of
the cease fire) prompted the United States to exert military
pressure in the form of the landing of United States Marines
in Thailand. The troops were a direct warning to the
Communists.
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While it may have been politically expedient for the
United States (chief elite of the organization) to change
its policy regarding Laos, its change triggered two inter
national effects:

(1) it disillusioned some members of

SEATO concerning the continued viability of that organiza
tion;^"^ and (2) part of the treaty area was in fact nibbled
away through negotiation from the original area.
^^Manchester Guardian, December 29 , 19 60 , p. 5,
col. 2. "1 } . the Foreign Kinister Thanat Khoman, recently
wrote that Thailand would increasingly seek better under
standing with ’other nations who do not share our views on
world issues . . . even . . . those who do not share our
social system.’ This astonishingly Nehruvian remark from
a spokesman of one of the most vocal anti-neutralists in
South-East Asia marks in part the final weariness with
carrying the American standard against the crises of
’lackey' and 'when are you going to become Asian again?"’
Subsequent Thai pressure on the United States to reassure
the Thai position evolved in the issuance of the Rusk-Khoman
declaration of March 6, 1962:
" . . . The Secretary of State
reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does
not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to
the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as
well as collective." It is interesting to note that the
British took an exact opposite view from that of the United
States. Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart, "British Foreign Policy
Today," Australian Outlook, XX (August, 1966), 12 3:
"Question: What is the attitude of your government in
Vietnam? Answer: That is, of course, a point on which we
and the American Government take a different view. The
American Government, as I understand it, do regard their
presence in Vietnam as being in fulfillment of obligations
under the SEATO Treaty. We do not feel,looking at what the
Treaty requires, that it would be incumbent on us to put
forces there because the SEATO Treaty exists.
If you study
the wording of the Treaty I think you will see that we are
justified in taking this view. We have held therefore, that
such help as we have given Vietnam, civilian help and so,
although entirely consistent with SEATO, is not actually
carrying out of our obligations. You will notice that SEATO
requires that, in case of direct aggression each country con
siders how it will act in accordance with its constitutional
processes--we are not all obliged under the Treaty to take
the same view, and broadly speaking we have not considered
this a case where the SEATO Treaty applied, but it is open to
the United States to take, as they do take, a different view.'
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Chapter MPAKISTAN-INDIAN CRISIS
In a region also close to the Treaty area, and
including a member-state of SEATO, another problem was in
the developing stage that soon strained relations between
other SEATO powers.
Pakistan, also a member of CENTO, is the third
Asian member of SEATO.
Pakistan important.

Its geographic location makes

Its 100-million-plus population marks

it as a potential power state.

Yet by the same criteria,

Pakistan has inherent problems that distract it from
realizing its potential.
Geographically, Pakistan is a divided nation with
over 1,000 miles of Indian territory separating its two
parts.

In its goal of becoming more industrially oriented,

Pakistan is beset with the problem of her population.

The

people must be fed; being mainly an agrarian state, Pakistan
does not have the immediate wealth available (using only one
criterion) to transform itself into an industrial society.
This is difficult enough in a unified state, but compounded
in a nation that is geographically divided.
The principal problem facing the Pakistanis is
India, or rather the enmity that exists between the Moslems
68
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and Hindus.

This is not a factor of nation-building, but is

a real political factor that was at hand before the parti
tion; led to the confrontation in 1965; and remains a prob
lem today.

How the Pakistanis view any external situation

is usually in the light of how it will affect the PakistaniIndian situation.^
It is problematical whether in one hundred years the
feeling now existing between the Moslems and Hindus will
still have the importance that it has now.

But to under

stand the intensity of feeling between Pakistan and India,
it is necessary to go back into the beginnings of these two
states.
The whole of the sub-continent of India had been
pressuring Britain

for many years to gain its freedom.

Mohandas K. Gandhi

and Jawaharlal Nehru, leaders of the All

Indian Congress Party, led the drive that eventually gained
this freedom.

But when freedom came, the continent was far

from being a homogenous unit.

It was stratified not only

sub-politically, but ethnically, linguistically, culturally,
and religiously.

Politically, India had been a fragmented

collection of over

500 princely states. By far the greatest

division, however,

was the religious one that separated

Hindus and Moslems.

^Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters (New York:
Oxford University Press, 196 7) , p p . 116-119.
Se’e also Drew
Middleton, America's Stake in Asia (Philadelphia:
J. B.
Lippincott Company, 196 8), pp. 147-151.
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Mohammed Ali Jinn ah, head of the Moslem League, had
been at one time a member of the All India Congress Party.^
Because he wanted equality in political matters for the
"Pakistanis" regardless of the fact that numerically they
were inferior to the "Indians," he broke with the Congress
Party when it failed to meet his demand.

The result was the

creation of the Moslem League with the political purpose of
setting up a separate state for Moslems.
Such a political course, with the goal of breaking
up what was then British India, was in direct conflict with
the leaders of the Congress Party.

The Indian (Congress

Party) goal was for a secular state in which all religions
would exist side by side, with religious freedom granted
to all.

Religious freedom, however, did not carry with it

"political equality."

What the Indians wanted was a state,

including all that was then India, incorporated into an
independent India.

It would follow, under the rules of

democracy, that the large majority of those Indians with a
Hindu background would then dominate the new political
structure.

What the Moslems wanted was a two-state forma

tion based on a religious disposition.
Such a dichotomy could not long continue.

Sir

Stafford Cripps headed the British delegation which had come

2Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States
Policy, ed. Dayton D. McKean (New York: Houghton MifTlin
Company, 1966), p. 16 5.
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out to India to arrange a general plan of independence.
Although he and others made many attempts to reconcile the
differences between the Moslem League and the Indian
Congress, all failed.

The final British decision was to

partition the country, carrying out the Moslem plan.
In reality, partition did not settle basic issues.
In place of the equality that Jinnah had wanted for the
Pakistani, all that he really obtained was a new political
setting.

In some respects, this left the Pakistani Moslems

in an even more inferior position.

Now the problems of

nation-building had to be met by the Pakistanis in an
impoverished geographic and industrial environment.3

While

the sub-continent is not without resources, its transforma
tion into an industrial and self reliant area demands
technology and wealth.

Thus, two nations are, because of

partition, competing for resources and available technology
that, for the present and foreseeable future, is adequate
only for the development of a single nation.
While the partition and religious question remain
vital factors that affect the relationship between the
Pakistanis and Indians, the problem of Jammu and Kashmir
is one situation that is in reality a manifestation of the
above problem.
3por a discussion of both Pakistani and Indian indus
trial capabilities, see Ibid., pp. 77, 89-90, 101; W. Norman
Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 142; Chaudhri Muhammad
A l i , The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia Univer
sity Press, 196 7), pp. 3 3 3-3 85, 337-338.
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Technically, Jammu and Kashmir are separate states,
but they are considered together as the "Kashmir problem."
In a discussion of the Kashmir problem, Norman D. Palmer
makes a succinct observation:

"The 'story of Kashmir' has

often been told, but perhaps never in a way which interested
outside observers would find both objective and intelli
gible."^

Kashmir, including Jammu, can be likened to a

catalyst that keeps aflame the basic enmity dividing the
Pakistanis (Moslems) and Indians (Hindus).

Since the parti

tion in 1947, this problem has been the vocal issue in which
politicians of both countries could take refuge.

In August

and September, 1965, however, it flared into open clashes
between the armed forces of both Pakistan and India.

After

a period of eighteen years of talking, complaining, jockey
ing, and making bellicose statements, antagonists provoked
open warfare in Kashmir.^

Both sides threatened an armed

clash, but probably neither wanted it.

Yet both sides

suffered considerable casualties and loss of war material;
and, in the end, the issue of Kashmir still was not settled.
Kashmir, in effect, represented a "final" piece of
the partition that had never been settled in 1947.

Kashmir

and Jammu were small in size, but by being in the northern

^Palmer, o p . cit. , p. 2 30 .
^AP dispatch. New York Times, August 11, 1985, p. 2,
col. 4. See also
dispatch. New York Times, August 12,
1965, p. 1, col. 4,
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China-border area, they were correspondingly important
beyond their size.

Kashmir covered some 84,471 square

miles (about the size of Minnesota).

Its population before

partition was, however, extremely important.

Moslems

accounted for approximately 77.11 per cent, Hindus for
20.12 per cent, Sikhs for 1.64 per cent, and Buddhists for
1.00 per cent.

The remaining few were Christians,

While

the country was predominantly Moslem, the ruling family of
Maharaja Hari Singh was Hindu.^
The partition had its legal base in the Indian
Independence Act of 19 47.
object of this act.

British India was the direct

The Princely States of India, however,

had a different status, and could, under the Act, choose
either Pakistan or India for making an accession.

Because

Moslems predominated in Kashmir, Pakistan fully expected
that Kashmir would elect to become part of Pakistan.
However, the Maharaja was reluctant to make any kind of
decision.

He did not like India, nor did he like Moslem

Pakistan.

He also mistrusted the Viceroy, Lord

M o u n tb a tte n ,?

with the result that he applied to both Pakistan and India
for a "Standstill Agreement."

^Brown, op. cit. , p. 159.
^He had had an escapade in Britain some years
earlier and had received bad publicity.
Ibid., p. 159,
and Chaudhri, o p . cit. , p. 2 88.
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Such an agreement for Kashmir was to be a "working"
relationship in the area of railway and general communica
tions facilities among autonomous units until more perma
nent arrangements could be worked out.

The Maharaja of

Kashmir offered this agreement to both Pakistan and India,
but only the Pakistanis accepted the arrangement.®
Events building to a Kashmir confrontation were
hastened by a march of tribesmen from Poonch.

Whether or

not this movement was originated, encouraged, abetted,
and/or armed by Pakistani authorities® is a moot question.
In any event, tribesmen invaded the Kashmir area in a
vengeful march on October 20, 1947.

After considerable

violence and bloodshed, the state forces of Kashmir,
composed of the security forces of the Maharaja, were routed
by the tribal lashkar.

The Maharaja fled Kashmir to Jammu

and there urgently requested assistance from India to help
restore order in Kashmir.
The Indian Government’s reply to this appeal by the
Maharaja produced the fait accompli that has since evolved
into the present dispute.

The Government, in effect, told

the Maharaja that for it to comply with his request for

®Brown, op. cit., p. 16 2, and Chaudhuri, op. cit.,
p.

288.

®There is some disagreement concerning whether or
not this "intrusion" by Moslem tribesmen was done without
the knowledge of Pakistani authorities.
Brown and Chaudhri
Muhammad Ali take opposite views.
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help, he would have to sign the instrument of accession to
India.

This he did, and India at once treated Kashmir as

an integral part of India.

The Pakistanis refused to

recognize this "legalization" of the Kashmir matter.
Pakistani troops eventually moved into the disputed area
to confront Indian forces.

In retaliation, and perhaps to

gain public support for its side, the Indians introduced
the "Kashmir question" to the Security Council of the United
Nations.
The United Nations Security Council, along with the
United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNICIP),
had made several attempts at settling the long-standing
dispute.

Failing that, both bodies had sought to bring the

sides together for meaningful negotiations.

All had failed.

The only concrete result of United Nations efforts had been
the stationing of personnel along the demarcation line that
separated the forces of both countries.
The Pakistani contention before the United Nations
was that India had violated its own agreement to conduct a
plebescite in Kashmir.

The Indian position was that certain

prerequisites to such a plebescite had to be met, namely
that all Pakistani forces would be withdrawn and infiltra
tion into Kashmir halted.

The Indians maintained that these

l^AP dispatch. New York Times, August 24, 196 5,
p. 6, cols. 1 and 2. See also AP dispatch, New York Times,
August 25, 1965, p. 11, col. 1.
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pre-conditions had not been met.

In addition, now that the

instrument of accession had been signed, the Indians
regarded it as no longer a valid point for discussion,
since Kashmir was now an integral part of the Indian union.
The United Nations was able to effect a cease fire
between the two adversaries in the 19 6 5 armed confronta
tion.^^

A meeting between President Mohammad Ayub Khan of

Pakistan and Mr. Lai Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of
India, took place in Tashkent (the Soviet Union) after that
country offered its good offices in assisting in a
negotiation.
Since the early 19 50 's, relations between the United
States and Pakistan, which at one time had been most warm
and cordial, began to "cool" considerably.

The clash

between Pakistan, a CENTO and SEATO ally, and India, also a
friend of the United States, posed an immediate and
anguished dilemma for the United States :

the position it

should take in this confrontation between two nations with
whom it had good relations.

The United States, seeing no

way out of this dilemma, chose a legalistic approach,

l^The United Nations Security Council Resolution
(authored by the Netherlands) was passed 10-0, Jordan
abstaining.
It called for a cease-fire within 48 hours
between the belligérants.^ dispatch. New York Times
September 21, 1965, p. 1, cols. 6 and 8. See also ibid.,
September 22, 196 5, p. 1, cols. 6 and 8, and ibid.,
September 23, 1965, p. 1, cols. 5, 7, and 8.
i^Ibid., September 20, 1965, p. 1, cols. 6, 7, 8,
and p. 2, col. 1.
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working through the machinery of the United Nations to bring
about a cease fire.

This occasioned the imposition of a

moratorium on arms shipments to both Pakistan and India.
Britain followed suit.
Pakistani reaction to this American move was
predictable :
Karachi . . . Informed sources said today it was highly
unlikely that Pakistan had categorically told the
United States that she would seek Soviet military
aircraft if Washington would not agree to replace
obsolete F-86 jet fighters of the Pakistan Air Force.
Washington . . . The State Department said today it had
no evidence that Pakistan would receive military jets .
. . . The White House has held up an expected pledge of
$300 million in aid to Pakistan pending a review of the
growing Pakistani ties to Moscow and Peking.
Pakistan
has reacted bitterly with charges that the United
States is seeking to impose aid with strings attached.
Pakistan’s war resources were inferior to India’s
in armed forces, war material, and the capacity for making
such equipment.

Pakistan needed to buy almost all of its

basic material abroad.

As a SEATO ally of the United

States, Pakistan had received almost $4 billion in military
and economic aid over the last d e c a d e . B u t

as the Pakis

tanis viewed it, their military needs were quite urgent.
In addition, what the Pakistanis had been claiming
for three years came about:

the vast quantities of aid

and arms that the United States and Britain had given to

l^Ibid., August 14, 196 5, p. 2, col. 5, and p. 4,
col. 4.
l^Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 2 70.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78
India in 1962^^ in its border clash with Red China were now
being used against Pakistan.

India, of course, was making

the same claim to the United States— that arms given the
Pakistani for "anti-Communist” defenses were being used
against India.
The unequal treatment they had received from the
United States had long rankled the Pakistani mind.

The

Pakistanis maintained that as an ally of the United States,
their nation should have a preferred position, as against
a country who (1) was not an ally, and (2) often opposed
United States policy on "ideological" grounds.

India, it

had been estimated, had received some $5.9 billion in
American aid, and, since the Sino-Indian clash, had obtained
an additional $200 million in military aid, with $80 million
more expected.

l^This refers to the Sino-Indian border clash which
occurred between October 20 and November 20, 1962,
The
United States and Britain sent massive shipments of arms to
help bolster Indian defenses.
Both the United States and
Britain stipulated that these arms were to be used only in
Indian defense against the Chinese invasion, and that they
were not to be used in any conflict with the Pakistanis.
The Indians gave these assurances.
l^New York Times, September 12, 1965, p. 1, cols. 7
and 8, and p~ 2, cols. 3"-8. See also Cecil V. Crabb, Jr.,
"American Diplomatic Tactics and Neutralism," Political
Science Quarterly, LXXVIII (September, 1963), 424. Pakis
tani official's publicly conceded, for example, that the
military buildup of their country would "force" India to
reach a settlement of the deadlocked Kashmir question.
While American arms were intended for defense. President
Ayub Khan of Pakistan stated that "it is an Asian country
(India) that has been oppressing us and continues to oppress
us." Evident differences existed between Washington and
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Pakistanis were rapidly deciding that it was not
worth being an ally of the United States if their chief
enemy was to get better treatment.

They began to look

elsewhere for aid.l?
A definite rapprochement with both Moscow and Peking
took place.

There is evidence that Peking definitely helped

Pakistan during the confrontation with India by making sud
den demands on India during the height of the fighting.

The

Chinese issued an "ultimatum" to India to dismantle its
bases on their mutual b o r d e r , w h i c h had the effect of
Karachi concerning the circumstances under which such
weapons might legitimately be used. To New Delhi, American
officials stressed that Karachi was pledged to "consult"
with the United States before employing them. Yet Presi
dent Khan stated openly, "'At times, our American friends
seem to question our right to defend our territory even,
or take such action as will bring security. . . . America
should be mindful . . . that if our territory was violated,
we should spend our time dealing with the enemy rather
than putting American weapons in cotton wool.'"
l?Khan, op. cit., pp. 117-119, 155-157.
"Another
major loss we suffered in joining the Pact (CENTO) was that
we were deprived of the opportunity to understand the Soviet
Union earlier.
The Russians were our neighbors and, as
later events proved, we would have been able to understand
each other better if some contact had been established
between us. Because of the absence of any contact, many
misunderstandings cropped up and the leaders of the Soviet
Union decided to give full support to India. This more than
nullified whatever economic and military advantages we gained
from the Pact. . . . Both the SEATO and CENTO Pacts have
lost much of the value they had, though they still retain
some kind of formal significance."
^^AP dispatch. New York Times, September 15, 1965,
p. 1, cols. 2-3.
See also ibid., September 17, 1965, p. 1,
cols. 6 and 8. The Chinese extended their deadline by three
days to the Indians; ibid., September 20, 1965, p. 1, cols.
5 and 8 and p. 2, col. 1. See also Anwar Syed, "SinoPakistan Relations— An Overview," Pakistan Horizon, XXII
(Second Quarter, 1969), 115-116.
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diverting much Indian strength to the northern frontiers,
where there were reports of an exchange of fire between
the Chinese and Indian forces.

It is quite probable that

this "help" was not lost on the Pakistanis, when during
the fighting, they found themselves almost "frozen out"
from their Western partners.
Better relations between Pakistan and China appeared
evident in the 196 3 border realignment agreement between the
two countries.

A Pakistani military mission was more than

cordially received in Peking.

*1 Q

While the Pakistanis, as

allies of the United States, had previously spoken out in
favor of a two-China policy, they no longer continued in
this vein.

And it should be noted that China, unlike the

Soviet Union, made no objection when Pakistan joined
SEATO.20
The Soviet Union also did a diplomatic about-face
regarding relations with the Pakistanis.

There had been

much made of the favorable balance struck between India and
the Soviet Union since the visit of Khruschev and Bulganin
to New Delhi.

Pakistani relations soon broadened into a

much firmer relationship which had as its result military

lOgyed, ibid., p. 111. See also the speech of Air
Marshal Nur Khan, "Pakistan-China Relations," Pakistan
Horizon, XXII (Third Quarter, 1969), 2 88. See also Dilip
Mukerjee, "India’s Defence Perspectives," International
Affairs, XLIV (October, 1968), 666-667.
2'^Harish Kapur, "China’s Relations with India and
Pakistan," Current History, LVII (September, 1969), 158.
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and economic benefits to Pakistan.

War material (mostly MIG

jets), loans, and Soviet experts assisting in several indus
trial developments came to P a k i s t a n . T h e Pakistanis were
also now receiving loans and trade missions from East
European countries.
Needless to say, this apparent shift of Pakistan
away from the United States caused concern in some circles.
Other issues— Indonesian independence, recognition of Red
China, the United States keeping the "Tunisian" question
from the United Nations Security Council agenda, and other
aspects of the cold war— on which the United States had
expressed itself have found Pakistan on the opposite side.
Pakistan is Moslem.

This aligns it with other

Moslem states in regard to the Israeli situation.

There

fore Pakistan as a nation now looks toward the other Moslem
states with more than just kindness.

The United States'

deepening commitment to Israel further widens the gap
between Pakistan and the United States.

But for the pres

ent, the central issue is Kashmir.
This new phase in Pakistani relationships with
other major powers bodes a turn away from past relatively
traditional ties to the United States.

How it will

eventually affect Pakistani ties to SEATO remains to be

21official communique issued in Rawalpindi on the
occasion of the visit to Pakistan of Premier Kosygin.
Pakistan Horizon, XXI (Second Quarter, 1968), 220-221.
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seen in future developments.

However, if past utterances

of Pakistani leaders are to be taken at face value, then
it may well be surmised that SEATO, as well as CENTO, ties
will lose what significance they held and a new posture of
alignment for Pakistan will unfold.
These then are the three primal cases needed for an
examination of political forces that were in progress with
direct effects on several of the powers belonging to SEATO.
They are used because of their critical nature and the fact
that they did involve five of the eight members.

While it

might be difficult to claim that in themselves they were
turning points or benchmarks as regards those particular
power’s outlook in their relationship toward either the
United States or SEATO, the claim can be made that taken
together they provide an essential insight into some of the
patterns of political directions that were, and are, taking
shape.

It is from these patterns that a factor of probabili

ties can be projected.
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Chapter 5
DISCUSSION
David Easton, in A Framework for Political Analysis,
states that for "tool" purposes, "any set of political
elements we wish to consider a system automatically becomes
one.
This study has used the "tool" of Professor
Brecher’s concept of a "geographic" system, i.e.. Dominant
System, Subordinate System.

It is assumed that the idea

of a geographic system is a system in reality.
The study of SEATO has been made within such a
constructed framework, with the series of situational crises
being presented as evidence.

It must be clear, however,

that the core area of concentration thus far has been in
the political interchanges among the members or units out
side the system of SEATO— with the exception of the Laotian
Crisis.

This paper is not a study of the sub-system of

SEATO as such.
For purposes of discussion, a focus can now be made
on the core area of SEATO.

What effect have the actions of

members had on the sub-system?
^David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.l Prentice-Hall Inc., 196T)7 p • 5T.
83
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It is well known that there are in the Global System
many groupings, alliances, and pacts that, irrespective of
some degree of cohesive quality, cannot bridge the division
that exists between their members.

There should be no dif

ficulty in accepting the idea that for conceptual purposes,
the total collection of other systems and sub-systems that
surround the sub-system of SEATO represents the ExtraSocietal

E n v iro n m e n t.2

The remainder of the totality of

environment is made up of those socio-economic-cultural
aspects which affect the society both internally and exter
nally.
If it is accepted that there are other systems and
sub-systems existing within the Global System,

it should

not be too difficult to accept that these other entities
have a relationship that is important to SEATO in two
respects.

First, one or more of these entities could con

ceivably be in competition or conflict with SEATO, if their
goals were diametrically opposed.

Second, where no goal-

competition existed between SEATO and other systems, dual
membership in other systems by member-units of SEATO has
taken place.

As a result, the possibility exists that the

The term "surround" is not used in the perjorative
sense where the object is the focal point; it merely con
notes the idea that the object has a random setting spa
tially.
The fact that such a unit could have another or
other units in competition with it is not used at this point,
O

This precludes membership in a Universal Actor such
as the United Nations.
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total allocative values of any unit, instead of being at the
disposal of SEATO, would have to be distributed on a wider
basis.

This is not to project that, because of the avail

ability of such resource to the individual units, such an
allocation on their part would be immediately forthcoming
to the sub-system of SEATO.

That determination or inter

action is implicit in this discussion.
The point has been raised that even during the
formative period of SEATO certain factors were present in
the system which were certain to produce stress.^

At the

system level, Britain and France were already engaged in the
process of restructuring their goals to match their dimin
ished capacity of resource allocation.

Such a restructuring

of goals necessitated political decisions which pointed to
a lesser involvement on the world scene.
Notwithstanding the fact that nation-states ulti
mately must fix the primacy of their own goals or national
interests, the question must be raised as to whether induce
ments or rewards from the chief elite might not influence
these political decisions.

Notwithstanding, the decisions

of Britain and France to alter their "presence" in Southeast
Asia would have a delimiting effect on their membership

^No contention is intended that an alliance, pact,
or sub-system is created that can be free from stressful
qualities.
In any association, it is assumed that the
authoritative person or persons has made an assessment of
factors present, with the hope or conclusion that positive
factors outweigh negative ones.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86
in SEATO and participation in the various functions of that
body.
It should be kept in mind that in the case of the
French, there was political demand for complete French
withdrawal in the Indo-China area.^

Internally, the French

political structure was going through a long period of
instability.

Other member-units could no longer count on

long term commitments from France in this area.
Another distraction (in the formative stages of
SEATO, and continuing to the present in varied degrees) for
the Western European Subordinate System was the question of
the EDO.

For many months a series of negotiating sessions

had been held with the view of constructing some form of
joint European defence community.

After the plan reached

the ratification state, French consent was crucial.

But

British promises of cooperation and United States promises
of aid apparently were not enough to overcome the French
fear of a re-armed Western Germany.®

This was a setback

to the plans of NATO for an overall defensive strategy.

®"Why Diplomats Are in Trouble: Their Own Govern
ments Can’t Back Them Up," U.S. News S World Report,
May 21, 1954, p. 36.
Also see in op. cit.:"U.S. Allies-Getting Weaker," pp. 28-29 ; "Men de s-Fran ce : It Is the End
of a Nightmare," July 30, 19 54, pp. 89-9 0.
®It is somewhat ironic that Britain, the very
nation that broached the idea of a type of "European" army
in the beginning, to a large degree was responsible for its
defeat. Anthony Eden in a speech in Rome declared that
Britain, while supporting the formation of such an entity,
could not itself join such a force.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

87
The result was that French reluctance created a serious
strain in Allied councils.

The French presented a proposal

that Britain and West Germany would not accept; the West
Germans had a plan that the French and British would not
accept; and the British were reluctant to make anything but
a nominal promise of assistance.

Yet, to the Western mind

(mainly the United States), EDC, or some form of closer
linking of European defense plans and resource capability,
in conjunction with NATO, clearly served as the key feature
in the whole global concept.
Essential to any perspective or understanding of
SEATO is the recognition and acceptance of two explicit
elements contained within the sub-system.

First is the item

that SEATO, like other similar defense treaties, is a
response body.

Second, there must be unanimity among the

units in regard to any action that the collective body
takes.

Closely associated with this second element is the

fact that the language contained within the instrument of
the Treaty denotes that "constitutional processes" of the
members will be met.
rt could be argued that such a shaping of SEATO at
the very beginning into a sort of deliberative body pre
cluded that it could ever be able to meet any military
commitment of its stated goal:
sion.

the containment of aggres

On the other hand, it could be logically argued that

the level or spirit of agreement attained by the language
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of the Treaty was all on which the participants would, or
could, effectively agree.

It should also be remembered that

the United States made an explicit addendum "understanding"
to the Treaty.?

Again, like other similar measures, SEATO

is an open system.

More stringent measures or additional

features can be added at later times.

One noteworthy

addition has been the adoption of a more sophisticated
mechanism in the Secretariat.
Both Easton and Young remark that an overload may
occur if "the channels of communication to receive such
demands cannot adequately handle the volume of the
demands."®
In the discussion of SEATO the aspect of membership
is important.

First of all, only three of the eight member-

units are in fact members of the "region" wherein the Treaty
Area lies.

The other members are extra-regional.^

caused disturbances from intra-societal areas.

This has

The "non-

Asiatic" quality of the majority of the member-units of
SEATO has caused adverse reactions from the Asian states.
India, Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indo
nesia have all adversely commented on not only the "nonAsiatic" quality of the membership of SEATO, but even on

?Appendix C, p. 134.
Byoung, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
^Melvin Gurtov, Southeast Asia Tomorrow (Baltimore;
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p p . 1^3.
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the fact that a force for collective defense was created
in the area.

And central to this general area of country

discontent was India.

She had been, is, and probably for

some time in the future will remain, a leader of the "Third
World" nations.
The concept of boundary provides the basis for a
second point about membership.

While Article VIII of the

Treaty defines the geographic area or boundary that is
encompassed, the very idea of boundary must then connote
something else because of membership.

While the Treaty area

is Asian, the Treaty group is made up of countries with dual
membership obligations, for in some cases the members belong
to other sub-systems or Subordinate Systems.

It must then

be accepted that the political boundaries of SEATO range
much farther than the stated Treaty Area.

In fact, we can

assume for political purposes the SEATO boundaries extend
to the influential limits of each member-unit.
While this may be a fundamental concept, it never
theless poses levels of a potential conflict of interest,
which, if occurring, could bring resultant conditions of
stress on the sub-system.

The relationship between sub

systems, in the form of NATO for example, or the Asian and
Pacific Council (ASPAC), or the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and SEATO, could be on divergent
courses.

As such, some powers, having membership in these

other organizations, as well as in SEATO, would be caught
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up in a foreign policy dilemma.

Added to this relationship

is the problem that extra-regionalism poses, with conditions
and demands of other subordinate areas which also contain
SEATO power members posing an equally serious dilemma.
While there is no evidence as yet obtainable
pointing to the making of a demand by France and Britain
on the United States for example, for certain dispositions
within the NATO structure concerning their actions during
the Suez affair, it would be hard to imagine that the
subsequent United States attitude and actions in response
to French and British moves did not have a profound effect
on these countries within the scope of their membership
within the Subordinate System of Western Europe.

It can be

further argued that such United States actions, if not
directly, at least in an indirect fashion, influenced later
thinking and political decision-making on the part of these
two powers.

If the failure of the Suez venture can be

credited as being the cause for the resignation of Anthony
Eden as British Prime Minister, then certainly the United
States, because of the actions that it took, must assume
part of that responsibility.
Earlier, the criterion of the qualitative factor was
mentioned as being important in that a demand, because of
its nature, could produce within a given system, such a
disturbance as to result in stress against that very system.
In this fashion, note should also be taken of subsequent
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French actions occurring within the framework of the sub
system of NATO, having an effect in the Subordinate System
of Western Europe where that sub-system is located.

This

refers of course to the French decision to request a with
drawal of all NATO facilities from French soil.^^

A French

demand that a change of policy on the part of the United
States was needed, with the implication that there will be
no French cooperation in stated goals, was thus injected
within the sub-system.

Increasingly, French attention,

under the then firm rule of Charles De Gaulle, was being
devoted to making France paramount on the Continent.

Any

thing that detracted from this goal was in basic conflict
with French interests.

From the many remarks that President

De Gaulle had made on the subject, it can be seen that the
presence of United States forces, although a necessary facet
of NATO tactical and strategic concepts, was nonetheless

iO"For some years, the French Government has indi
cated on numerous occasions, both public and in conversa
tions with the Allied Governments, that it considered the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization as no longer fulfilling,
insofar as it is concerned, the conditions prevailing in the
world at present, which are fundamentally different from
those of 1949 and the years thereafter. . . . The French
Government considers these agreements in their entirety,
as no longer fulfilling the present conditions, which lead
it to reassume full exercise of its sovereignty on French
territory, in other words, to accept being responsible in
any respect whatsoever to authorities other than the French
authorities.
It is prepared to study and eventually, to
settle with the United States Government the practical con
sequences of this. . . . "
French Foreign Policy:
Official
Statements Speeches and Communiques 19 66 ( N e w Y o r k :
Ambassade t)e France, Service de Presse et d'information,
1966), pp. 25-27.
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interpreted by De Gaulle as being an inhibitor to the
French.

Further, and to a larger degree, the presence of

United States economic prowess, as manifested by the
increasing influx of powerful corporate interests into the
European economic life further enlarged these French fears.
In SEATO the situation of both demands and conflict
ing "cross-demands" has been experienced.

As was seen in

the Laotian Crisis, the demands by the chief elite were of
such a nature as to cause a disturbance within the sub
system.

At that point, the communicative process of a

feedback was either being ignored by the chief elite--the
United States— or was at a low stage because of a failure to
alter goals, or was a combination of the two induced by the
inability of the United States to alter its own objectives,
thereby setting into motion diplomatic maneuvers which
met objection by other member-units.
There are several alternatives which can be taken
when a system is presented with an imbalance or disturbance
leading to a stress condition.
If a system or state cannot cope with the stress,
then it can "escape," or at least relieve some of the
pressures of the induced stress by several methods.

Essen

tially, these fall into three general areas or levels;
first it can accept the condition; second, it can reject
such conditions or demands that impose the stress ; or
third, it can either alter the structure of its own
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organization so as to comply with the conditions set forth,
or alter the nature or status of those demands so as to
conform with the already established structure or system.
For France, regarding her problems in the sub-system
of NATO and the Subordinate System of Western Europe, it can
be discerned she opted for the form of the second solution.
In the case of the Laotian Crisis, it will be seen that the
third solution, with the alteration of goals or demands made
by the chief elite was made with subsequent adjustments in
problem perception carried out.

Such a reduction by the

chief elite, in its qualitative demand for strong measures-conceivably culminating in the use of force in the back-up
of those demands— thereby resulted in a better acceptance by
the other SEATO powers.
Built into the structure of SEATO is the conflictmechanism— conditions for disturbance— of unanimity.

While

this mechanistic function was an accepted feature of SEATO,
it nonetheless must be viewed as a definite impediment to
a system.

A condition of reciprocity can set in when a unit

on the "losing" side views the response of the "winners"
(in this case the diminished or altered collective response)
as not meeting what it believes to be minimal conditions for
its continued functioning or participation in the system.
This whole area of discussion leads to an important
element as crucial to this review as it is to any foreign
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policy deliberation:

that is the concept of problem-

perception on the part of the individual members of the
sub-system.
David V. Edwards, describing conditions of problemperception, states that:

"Man reacts, of course, to how he

perceives reality rather than to reality as such.

The sum

of what we think we know, rather than what is really true,
determines what plan or policy we adopt and what actions
we then attempt.

And, of course, the critical factor of

this "perception" on the part of the decision-makers or
states is the concept of values.
Values, in this context, takes on added significance
as Edwards makes the comment:

"Throughout history those who

have been concerned with human action have often contended
that one or another action or institution was the 'best'
or 'correct' one.

Such contentions have often resulted in

arguments and even wars because debaters were arguing about
objective facts rather than about preferred values.
In any discussion of SEATO, one must always come
back to the base motive of each power for joining SEATO.
Just what was there in the suggested alliance that would
attract states to join such a body?

Would such a joining

result in the enhancement of their individual position and

l^David V. Edwards, International Political Analysis
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. TT.
IZlbid., p. 24.
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would it benefit the goals or values that they had set forth
for themselves to follow, and,if possible, achieve?
Could it not perhaps be a deduction that there were
some three broadly conceived ideas that motivated the
eventual members of SEATO in joining the alliance?

The

United States, as the prime architect of SEATO, still
remained in the throes of its struggle with the menace of
Communism as manifested in the actions of the Soviet Union.
The absorption of Poland into the Red orbit--accompanied as
it was by the mysterious death of Jan Masaryk in Czechoslovakia--did little to alleviate United States' suspicions
concerning overall Russian expansionist endeavors.

Added

to this was the trouble that the Allied powers had had with
the Russians in Berlin and the subsequent airlift to over
come the Russian "blockade."

And there had been the costly

Korean War that the United States and its allies had con
cluded with a stalemate.

Such "evidence" as this convinced

many of the decision-makers in the United States that the
Communistic monolith could only be combatted successfully
by a "ring of containment."

Finally, there was the deterio

rating situation that the French found themselves in in the
Indo-China area with the "Communist" forces of the Vietminh.
If anything further was needed to convince the American
administration that Communism was indeed on the march
against the principles and ideals of Western democracy,
there was the loss of mainland China to Communist control.
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Surely, only a show of resolve and force in the way of a
buffer or "dike" could prove effective to settle this
dilemma.

That buffer would be SEATO.
Thailand viewed the evolving situation in South-East

Asia and the Far East in much the same light that the United
States did.

The Thais were increasingly worried about their

own large segment of Chinese living in Thailand.

There was

the further worry of the Northeastern and Southern provinces
that were, in effect, soft-spots in the Thai position.

Then,

too, not only were the French fighting next door in the
Indo-China area, but the British as well were having their
Communist troubles in Malaya.
It is quite true that these problems did exist.

It

is also true that there was at that time a feeling of un
easiness concerning the colossus that China was felt to be
and the eventual designs that she was thought to have out
side her territory.

It would be quite easy to rationalize

that because of these problems being so close to Thailand,
that she was justified in feeling endangered.

It would be

therefore quite logical for her to give support to a plan
that would in some manner offer her a collective-type
security arrangement.
Cognizance should be given to the fact that logic
often fails to lend perception when trying to fathom between
that which is real and that which is merely superficial in
foreign policy.

This would hold especially true in the case
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of Thailand.

Professor George Modelski gives an excellent

account of Thai politics and their seeming fluctuating
s t a t e . A c c o r d i n g to Prince Wan Waithayakorn, the then
Foreign Minister of Thailand, the specter of mainland China
did indeed pose a problem for the Thais for which they
sought assistance in relieving this seeming pressure.

At

the same time, Thai membership in the Treaty was viewed as
". . . not only non-aggressive but also non-provocative.
While this attitude may have been the prevailing one
at the time, and in spite of the fact that Thailand now lets
armed forces of the United States be stationed on Thai soil
thereby permitting somewhat "clandestine” air strikes being
made in Laos and Vietnam, it would nonetheless appear that
there is a change occurring in the Thai role toward its big
neighbor China.
Part of this change, subtle as it may appear,
apparently stems from Thai reaction to what they felt should
have occurred in SEATO as regards the Treaty Area, and what
in fact did not.

With that in mind, it should not be too

surprising to see that the Thais would begin to re-examine
their position to see what new avenues would have to be
explored in order to preserve the essential ingredient,
Thai sovereignty and integrity.
l^George Modelski, "Thailand and China," Policies
Toward China: Views from Six Continents, ed. A. M. Halpern
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 348-'36 7.
l^Ibid., p. 352.
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As an indication of this new attitude, the publicly
stated views of the current Foreign Minister, Dr. Thanat
Khoman, should be examined quite closely.

A second indica

tion of this attitude would be Thai participation in— and
in one case, Thai organization of--the relatively new,
strictly Asiatic regional organizations that now appear in
this area.
It is conjectural at this point whether or not the
joining by Thailand of substitute organizations would have
taken place if they felt completely satisfied with SEATO.
Certainly the economic aspects of ASEAN and ASPAC represent
a hope for increased development in this area of the world
that is so in need of every economic tool of which it can
take advantage.

Yet at the same time, the appearance of

this development, accompanied as it is by Thai official
statements that " . . .

Thailand would increasingly seek

better understanding with other nations who do not share
our views on world issues . . .

would lend strength to

the idea that a change of direction is being instituted in
Thailand's foreign policy outlook.
Pakistan and the Philippines present differing out
looks in how they viewed the construction of SEATO.

On the

one hand, the Philippines have had traditional ties with the
United States and it was axiomatic that they would go along

iSpalmer, o p . cit., p. 16 5.
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with the United States on such a venture.

They were

insular, and such a further "commitment" in addition to
the Mutual Security treaties of 19 51, 19 52, and 195 3 with
the United States was not without benefit as President
Magsaysay saw it.

In addition, the Philippines was just

emerging from an internal fight with the Hukbo ng Bayan
Laban sa Hapon (Huks) who, from many appearances, did have
some Communist connections.

Yet, an increasing anti-

American feeling has begun to make itself evident in the
Philippines with a subsequent shift of Philippine policy
becoming more independent from that of the United States.
An indication of this change, for just one example, was the
withdrawal of the 2,000 man Philippine contingent that had
previously been sent to Vietnam to assist South Vietnamese
and American forces.
In the case of Pakistan, the enigma and "Achilles
Heel" that exists in both her internal as well as external
policies has at its root the problem of India.

This has

caused, and will continue to cause, blind spots in the
Pakistani quest for general security.

Be that as it may,

it does not cover up serious and even extreme problems
that have and will face the Pakistani on their road to

l^This position was corroborated in an interview
I had with the Speaker of the Philippine House of Repre
sentatives. A further indication of the position was
also given by an aide to the now President of the Philip
pines, Ferdinand Marcos.
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nation-building.

"The unity of Pakistan lies in its

adherence to Islam, yet Islamic thought, and the retrograde
attitudes of the sect leaders, hinders the creation of a
meaningful political entity."

Leicester Webb here touches

on a most salient point, and it is perhaps the real crux
of the problem of Pakistan.
Nevertheless, the polity of Pakistan has, and more
or less to the same degree establishes, its view toward
other powers in light of their position and attitude to
India.

This has led to a Pakistani rapprochement with both

Moscow and Peking— the latter ironically being the central
reason for the formation of SEATO.

Thus there would appear

to be truth in the statement that " . . .

Pakistan's main

concern was the alleged Indian threat and not the defense
of South-East Asia against Communist expansion.

. . .

^

Such a rapprochement or re-alignment would of necessity
mean a shift of ties or loyalties away from a strictly
doctrinaire stance that is posed by the presence of SEATO.
It should be noted, however, both in the case of Pakistan
and Thailand, that Red China did not really direct any
polemics against them merely because of their membership
in SEATO.

It was really only after the stationing of United

States armed forces in Thailand that Red China began a

l^Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan and China: The Scope
and Limits of Convergent Policies," Policies Toward China:
Views from Six Continents (New York: McGraw-HillV 19650,
p. 2Ü1.
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concerted campaign of implied threats against Thailand,
for, rightly or wrongly, the Chinese viewed such a measure
as a constituted threat against them directly.
On a comparative note, Australia and New Zealand,
because of their location, population, and lack of an ade
quate armed force capability, can be considered minimal
powers.

Their previous adherence to the protective capa

bility of Britain was divested by Britain herself due to
the retrenchment of resources at home and the ensuing
withdrawal of British forces "East of Suez."

Faced with

this reality, and positioned as they are in an environment
of over one billion Asiatics, who are in one form or
another somewhat hostile to Western culture and the memories
of colonialism that it conjures up, it is not too surprising
that they should gravitate toward the one power whom they
feel they have close ties to and who, at the same time, has
interests in the Pacific area— the United States.

Only the

United States, a friendly power as it were, had sufficient
power to fill the vacuum that the departure of both the
British and French created.

So, in addition to being

gratified with the creation of the security that the ANZUS
Pact brought, the formation of SEATO posed yet another
answer, and, as it were, the supposed additional security
of additional powers confronting the Communist threat.

At

the heart of the matter, though, was the overwhelming power
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capability of the United States that gives reality to this
or any commitment.
The problem perception of Britain and France pre
sented an entirely different appraisal of the situation as
that looked upon by the other powers of SEATO.
colonial powers at the time.

Both were

While Britain was giving up

her Empire on a relatively easy basis, France was engaged
in a bloody and hotly-contested war in Indo-China that was
proving costly to her in men and resources, and was begin
ning to be so unpopular at home as to affect the stability
of the government.
Britain still had close ties with Australia and
New Zealand as well as Malaya, Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei and
her Crown Colony of Hong Kong.

And it should be assumed

that Britain would remain loyal to these ties in the event
of any real trouble that affected them.

Notwithstanding,

it could be assumed that the British decision was motivated,
not so much in the vein that Red China constituted a real
threat in the form of expansionist moves, but served as a
ready-made solution that had the advantage of permitting
a reduction of British forces in the area under the "safety"
of an American presence.

At the same time it retained a

British "voice" as regards any serious decisions that had
to be made in that area, and through this medium also
retained some measure of the old "Empire Life-line"
presence that could serve as a redeeming factor to both
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Britain and the colonial and Commonwealth members in that
area.

Underlying though it may be, a British participation

in the SEATO Treaty of 19 54 made up for the omission of
Britain in the 19 51 ANZUS Pact.
In essence, then, it can be surmised that the above
represented some goals or values that could be achieved,
or at least benefit a powers membership in such an organiza
tion as SEATO.
But time stands still for no one, and while the peri
od of fifteen years that SEATO has been in existence can be
considered a short span of time, it can also be more than
enough to witness events and elements of change that by
their nature either alter or even obviate values and goals
once considered important.
Polarity, which once was an accepted state of exist
ence in the world scene, has now evolved into a form of
"soft" polarity, or even a form of polycentrism.

Causing

that evolution has been a series of factors, but central to
it has been the detente that has come about between the two
giants, the United States and the Soviet Union.

As such,

the problem or perceived threat of Communism to the Western
and Third World has seemed to diminish.

And with that

diminuation has come a shift in attitudes on the part of
the leaders of many countries, not the least of which
includes members of the SEATO organization toward both
the Soviet Union and China.
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If, then, the Soviet Union and China really do not
represent a threat to the vital interests of the members
comprising SEATO, and for that matter the other nations as
well, then positions taken, attitudes assumed, and alloca
tions of resources made can be shifted to other areas.

In

this case, those areas of concern and concentration would
be the internal ones of the various states.
Few nations of the world are so well resourcefully
and technologically advanced— with attendant industrial
capacity— that they can long afford to have their society
and economy geared constantly to an external crisis level.
Fewer still have societies that would allow such a situation
to continue if only a "stalemate" occurred from the resul
tant process.

There are several reasons for this, but if

only one is advanced, it would be the level of competition
in economy that exists between the many nations of the
world.

A nation today can ill afford to fall behind in

the race for

p r o g r e s s .

As J. J. Servan-Schreiber points

out, a very real dilemma faces the nations of Europe.19
The need for growth and development at a faster rate encom
passing the levels of innovation, technology, and scientific

1 This excludes consideration of the underdeveloped
nations and takes into account primarily the nations of
Europe and Japan.
Because of their advanced status, it would
also exclude the two superpowers.
19J. J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge
(New York: Atheneurn, 1969), pp. 26, 40-41, 102-105.
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research are the criterion that will be needed.

This can

be achieved easier in a political environment that is
relatively free from the economic burdens that a crisis is
generally accompanied by.

This is not meant to imply that

those nations who are free from foreign entanglements are
necessarily going to advance more rapidly than others.
There are many examples to the contrary.

However, that

nation or nations which are relatively free from foreign
commitments perhaps have a better chance at succeeding.
In this vein, whether by design or happenstance, the
posturing of both Britain and France would seem to bear this
out.

They may rationalize differently concerning their

motives, but the end result is that they are ridding them
selves of outside en cumb e ran ce s and focusing their attention
more and more within the Subordinate System that is Western
Europe.
And here, also, the economic struggle carries with
it political overtones.

It might be said that politics

protects the economic level, while the economic level in
turn supports the political level.
had already taken place.

Clashes of interests

It was primarily in consideration

of its stake and position in Algeria that moved the French
to join with Britain and the Israel in the attempt to
subvert Nasser's position during the Suez crisis.

As much

as the American stance proved humiliating to the British,
it was equally hard for the French to accept.
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General de Gaulle, during his long tenure in office
as French President, had as his primary goal the restoration
of France as the principal power on the European Continent.
To accomplish this necessitated a severe reduction of an
American political as well as economic presence on the
Continent.

Servan-Schreiber's book builds a very compel

ling French case.

The moves by the General as regards his

actions against NATO, and subsequent monetary positions
against the dollar were in line towards such reduction.20
At the same time, to further the role of France
as the leader in fact as well as spirit, the General sought
to hurry the East-West detente along by political moves,
statements, and trips that would re-establish the previously
held close French relationship with the Soviet Union thereby
further reducing the tension-level between the two ideologi
cal camps.
French recognition of Red China ; withdrawal of the
French representative at SEATO Ministerial Council meetings;
General de Gaulle's pronouncements in Cambodia; all seemed
designed to accomplish the same thing with China as had been
done with the Soviet Union.

There was a tacit recognition

that a problem did not in fact exist, and with that under
standing, the assumption that each was relatively free to
2^Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C.
Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, France, Germany and the
Western Alliance (New York: Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1Ô6 7),
p p . 5 8-78.
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pursue what they considered to be their own national
courses, somewhat assured that those courses would not
collide.
Coincidental to this was the development of a French
force de frappe--which would not inhibit in the least the
stature of France— and the still to be relied upon American
nuclear deterrence capability that existed in NATO and SEATO,
organizations that the French had not resigned from.
A further example of clashes within the Subordinate
System level was the struggle between Britain and France
concerning British entry into the Common Market.
wanted in and France wanted to keep her out.

Britain

And although

external to Western Europe, the Anglo-American Skybolt
affair could not but have its adverse effect on British
standing on the Continent.

The British had once again been

dealt a blow by their American friends.
Thus it can be found that a changed atmosphere and
conditional setting has come about.

It should be no wonder

then that some of the attitudes of the SEATO powers has also
been affected by this change.
Slowly taking shape, and thereby creating the begin
nings of a new trend in the Asiatic area, is a manifestation
of one of these settings:

the appearance of new forms of

Regionalism that is relegated to entirely Asiatic members.
ZTpor an account of this, see Richard Neustadt,
Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
19 70}, pp'. 30-55.
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Starting with the "Colombo" powers conference of 1950,^2
a new sense and form of regionalism has entered the Asian
area.

States, previously aloof from the problems and

concerns of other states, slowly began to realize that their
own problems were also problems of sister states.

An aware

ness of interdependence is gradually displacing previous
animosities.
Colombo, MaPhillndo, ASA, ASPAC, ASEAN, and ADB all
represent a moving together rather than a movement away from
each other.

SEATO can fit within this movement.

While there are many differences in the above organi
zations, it should be recognized that they have a common
ground in the possible uniting of peoples and societies to
bring solutions to age-old problems.

In this area where

there is such a serious population problem and where poverty
is, for the most part, a way of life, there is at least a
foundation for new hope.
It is significant that some solidarity within the
Subordinate System of Southern Asia is beginning to make
itself felt.

It bodes a shift away from the Western

European Subordinate System and even from the Dominant
System.

In this context Western influence is gradually

22Carlos P. Romulo, former Foreign Minister of the
Philippines, uses the Bandung Asian Conference of 19 56 to
mark the new era of regionalism in Asia.
Carlos P. Romulo,
"The New Asian Ideology," Pacific Community, I (October,
1969), 37.
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being replaced by the awareness of a newfound strength by
the units that make up the Southern Asian system.
ASA, ASPAC, and ASEAN all had their beginnings
after the formation of SEATO.

It is noteworthy also that

Thailand, previously one of the most vocal adherents of
SEATO, was a firm proponent in the formation of these other
sub-systems.
Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister, made this
statement :
The European powers in Asia have all returned to
Europe.
They are not interested in this area anymore.
They are parochial and insular.
They are now only
regional powers.
The British and the French, for example, have left
forever.
The Americans will leave one day. The days
of the big military pacts are over.
In Europe, NATO,
and in Southeast Asia, SEATO, are in general decay.
Collective defense arrangements therefore have great
problems.
What then is left? I have scratched my head hard
enough to think of alternative policies to meet the
problems and there is only one answer. All countries
in the region must rely on themselves. They must stand
on their own feet, improve their economies, their
social structures and their capacity to withstand
subversion from without and from within. This can only
be done by means of regional co-operation between the
countries of the area through organizations like ASPAC
and ASEAN to which we in Thailand attach great impor
tance as means of political, economic and social inter
change and the exchange of information of common
interest.^ 3

2^Opening Address, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
at the Inaugural Session of the ASEAN Ad Hoc Committee on
Civil Aviation, Bangkok, June 25, 196 8 (Permanent Mission
of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release No. 52,
July 8, 1968), pp. 3-4.
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The formation of such systems does not assure these
units of automatic success or accomplishment of goals.
There are many problems to be faced, but the very formation
of such systems is an important step.
several systems is all Asian.

The membership of the

Extra-regional powers are

conspicuous by their absence.
ASPAC— including Japan— is the largest of the new
systems.

Somewhat contrary to Thai aims, ASPAC does not

preach any anti-Communist d o c t r i n e , i n view of the desire
of the Japanese to build stronger economic ties with the
mainland.

ASPAC does, however, concentrate on economic,

social, and cultural interests--as does ASEAN.

These pacts

may in the future form the basis of some type of security
9s

arrangement.

The economic character of ASEAN, ASPAC, and others
can lend great assistance to political stability.

In seek

ing to overcome the visible economic shortcomings that most
of the developing nations have in Southern Asia, the

2^Kiichi Aichi, "ASPAC Still Young and Fluid,"
Pacific Community, I (October, 1969), 5.
2^Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand: Revolution and
Reaction in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper S Row, 1969),
pp. 16-1Y. See also Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement
in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy (Fnglewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall” 1969) , p p . 9 8-130 . Gorden
states that ASA (forerunner to ASEAN) represents the
"second" phase of the development of Asian regionalism; the
"first" phase being Colombo, ECAFE, and SEATO involving
non-Asian powers.
See Eugene R. Black, Alternative in
Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969),
p p . 43-45.
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countries have first had to solve some of their intraregional problems such as the Indonesia and Malaysia problem
and the differences between the Philippines and Malaysia.
This is being done and steps toward economic
cooperation and integration are taking place.

Adding

significance to this development is the instituting of the
Asian Development Bank (ADB).

While such asset capabilities

as the ADB does have is small in comparison to the vast
demands that can be placed against it, it nonetheless
signals a new recognized level in the overall regional
picture unfolding in that part of the world.
Regional development, with its concentration on the
economic aspect, will not in itself guarantee success for
the present and future member states.

Basic to any success,

either individually, or collectively, lies the need for
political stability to be maintained in the respective
countries.

That, of course, hinges on several factors, not

the least of which is the present rivalry that exists
between Moscow, Washington, D.C., and Peking.
Economic development for these under-developed
nations in large measure depends on their ability to make
an almost total resource allocation toward this goal.
Implicit within this factor, which in itself presents many
and varied problems, is that for such an allocation to be
made, the general area should be free from any "security"
type problem.

At the time of this writing, I do not forsee
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that such a "security" type problem will not in fact present
itself:

either Russia could make a power move into the

Indian Ocean with the subsequent ramifications that that
could bring with it, or there could be a further intensifi
cation of the rivalry between Moscow and Peking.
This is problematical and only the future can tell
what some of the end results will be.

It nevertheless

points to very possible difficulties that lie ahead.
As originally conceived, SEATO, in conjunction with
NATO, and later with the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO), completed
the loose geographical framework of containment of the
Soviet and Chinese Communist threat.

The Treaty specified

both overt and covert threats to its area, and the United
States stipulation to the Treaty was clearly aimed at a
Communist threat.
SEATO:

This has been and remains the goal of

a rejection of Communist expansion into the Treaty

Area.
The United States action in Vietnam is an indication
of this country's attitude toward such incursions.

That the

SEATO goal, as manifested by United States action was not
wholly accepted by members of the system can be seen by the
minimal specific support given to it by only four members—
Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

On

the other hand, three members— Britain, France, and Pakistanhave declined any form of support.

And in the case of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113
Philippines, such specific support— 2,000 combat engineers-has now been removed.
Such a degree of non-support is damaging in itself.
But since South Vietnam is one of the Protocol States of the
Treaty, the situation is all the more delicate in terms of
relationships among the member-units.
The situation is further compounded when the factor
of "stipulated” invitation, as set forth in the Treaty, is
taken into account.

An aggrieved government must first

invite the participation for SEATO action prior to: (1) it
becoming an agenda item to be discussed; and (2) a collec
tive decision being taken for a form of action.
Given the above conditions, it then becomes evident
that such governments as Laos and South Vietnam would be
counseled not to make an appeal to SEATO, since it would be
known beforehand that such an appeal for intervention or
action on the part of SEATO would be doomed by a failure to
achieve a unanimous consent.
Three alternatives present themselves.

First, those

units desiring a complete fulfillment or achievement of
stated or perceived goals may continue to push for these at
the expense of creating such a condition of stress as to
endanger the continued existence of the organization.
Second, in lieu of such a fulfillment, the goal might be
perceptibly altered so as to gain complete unanimity. Third,
leaving the system intact as it is, unilateral or bilateral

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114
action on the part of certain powers may be taken, but not
in the name of the system.

It would appear that this third

alternative is in effect at the present time as regards the
United States.
But even this third alternative is beginning to
change under pressure.

United States involvement in the

Vietnamese conflict has never been popular, at home or
abroad.

One of the stated goals of Richard Nixon in his

Presidential campaign, as well as later when he had assumed
the office of the Presidency, was that he would bring an
end to American involvement there.

It might be seen that

such a policy as "Vietnamization," and the espousal of the
"Nixon Doctrine" to alter the type of any future American
involvement, represents a feedback response on the part of
the chief elite of SEATO to make a decided change of policy
that presumably would find a general consensus within that
system.

It remains to be seen, however, if this will

result.
It cannot be said that SEATO has been an absolute
success.

Neither can it be said that it has been an abject

and dismal failure.

Success, after all, is a relative

thing, and given the diversity of membership that exists
within the SEATO membership, it can naturally be assumed
that some will be perfectly satisfied with what they concieve of SEATO having accomplished, while others will take
an opposite stance.
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The stated objective of SEATO has been the rejection
of aggression in the Treaty area, or against any state
designated as aggressive by the SEATO powers.

In a strict

interpretation of that objective, SEATO has indeed fulfilled
its requirement as a deterrent force.

The directed meaning

of aggression was of course aimed at Peking,

With the

exception of the Sino-Indian border dispute, there has been
no overt expansive moves by the Chinese since the Korean
War, which occurred prior to the formation of S E A T O . A t
the same time, the present Vietnamese conflict should not
be considered as pertaining to SEATO per s e , for it too had
its beginnings prior to the Manila Pact.

That is taking

into account the legalistic approach which might be used,
that technically the Geneva Accords of 19 54 had been vio
lated.

It should be remembered, however, that the United

States was not a signatory to those accords.
It is conjectural what would have happened in SouthEast Asia had there not been the presence of a security sys
tem like SEATO in effect--the same speculation would lend
itself to NATO in Europe.

Access to diplomatic records in

Peking and Moscow are unavilable to Westerners, so at this
time it would be impossible to ascertain whether or not
Peking really did have expansionist designs in South-East

Z^This of course excludes the Sino-Russo border
dispute which was limited to strictly Communist powers.
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Asia and was in fact deterred by the factor of SEATO and the
nuclear might of the United States which backed it up.

The

fact remains, however, that there has been no overt move on
the part of the Chinese,
The above represents an affirmative or optimistic
view.

A negative or pessimistic view would have to record

the level of disrepute that SEATO is held in, not only by
some Third World powers, but by some SEATO members as well.
If, as some quarters profess, some powers who are members
of SEATO at present are in effect giving indications to
Peking that they will do nothing to hinder Chinese moves
in an area that normally could be considered as being within
the Chinese sphere of influence, then much of the deterrent
quality of SEATO would have been nullified.

There is no

denying the fact that disillusionment has set in with some
members of SEATO, and this could well be an indication of
future troubles for that organization.
Conclusions
Not too long ago, an American President made a
statement to the effect that we no longer solve problems
in the international area, we cite them and try to manage
them.2 7

In that statement was the recognition that the

United States does not have the capacity to "solve" problems

2 7gorensen, o p . cit., p. 511.
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that erupt from interactions among world powers.

To solve

the problems would mean that the United States would have
to involve itself with other states, a situation which it
neither desires nor has the capacity to enact.
In a similar vein, the author would not want to fall
into a trap of having made an examination of a problem by
using a still hypothetical approach, adding to it material
which is not in itself exhaustive, and then trying to draw
concrete conclusions.
Instead, in the absence of hard conclusions, there
remain definite indications toward conclusive possibilities.
Likelihood Number One:

The forces of polycentrism--

and with it, the subsequent attending attraction of the
respective Subordinate system— are beginning to make more
and more of a demand on the individual members of SEATO with
a resultant reduction of ties to that sub-system.

An allu

sion was made in the beginning that because of membership in
other systems, both natural and artificial,28 a sort of
"spill-over" effect was beginning to make itself felt within
the sub-system of SEATO.
In particular, Britain and France fall into this
classification because of their European orientation.

Their

membership in the NATO sub-system presents added political

2 8nere the term "natural" refers to geographic
contiguity, hence Brecher's rationale; while the term
"artificial" refers to a constructed system made up of
elements at large whether contiguity is or is not a
criterion.
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problems which have resulted in divisions between not only
themselves as units of the system, but also with the chief
elite.
The presence of EEC adds the element of economics
and related political problems.

As previously stated by the

French, one of the factors for their opposing British entry
into EEC was the general unbalanced state of the British
economy.

One of the major drains on any economy— and in

particular the British--is the budget for defense.

Such a

budget is determined largely by previous or predicted
political commitments.

Such a posture by the British to

effect serious reductions in their troop commitments on the
Continent, their policy of withdrawal "East of Suez," and
the withdrawal from the base at Aden, point to a British
realignment that is designed to bring about a general
strengthening of the British economy.
From the French view it would seem that a goal of
French hegemony on the Continent would in no way be compat
ible with a more chauvanistic policy elsewhere, particularly
in Indo-China where memory of the defeat at Dien Bien Phu
still must be considered a psychological and political
factor.

In addition, with French economic leadership making

itself felt in former French possessions in Africa, a hard
political stand in South-east Asia by the French would under
mine gains already made in these politically sensitive areas.
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A supposition could be made that these factors
influence to a greater degree the actions of Britain and
France than do the considerations of SEATO, the other sys
tem to which they belong.
Likelihood Number Two:

The political scene as well

as political leadership is changing.

One factor of conse

quence in that perceived change is an easing of tension in
the Cold War.

A result is the réévaluation of once-held

doctrines by SEATO members, as well as by other members of
the Dominant System and Global System.
As pointed out by many responsible political
scientists and historians, the polarization which once was
paramount in the international scene has gradually started
to soften.

Political figures of both the East and West have

for some time made public statements and, we can surmise,
corresponding diplomatic moves to ease tensions that hereto
fore marked the division between West and East.
Foremost among the political figures who had sought
to achieve this re-orientation had been President Charles
de Gaulle of France.

Such a detente (on a bilateral basis)

has also been sought— and achieved with a high degree of
success— by the Pakistani.

Noteworthy is the fact that

London, Paris, and Rawalpindi have all recognized Peking.
Note should also be taken of the French persistence
and courses of action taken designed to "thwart" and thereby
reduce American influence both in NATO and in the economic
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sector on the Continent.

Whether the rapprochement that

Paris seeks with Moscow has as its base the desire to reduce
Russian-European tensions and open the way for further
French hegemony advancements on the Continent, or the ex
clusion of American economic influence for the same result,
the political consequences remain the same.

The "specter"

of Soviet expansion into Western Europe is being eroded.
Pakistani pre-occupation with the Kashmir problem
can be credited with the change of political attitude of
Rawalpindi toward both Moscow and Peking.

In this change,

it would seem a remote possibility that the Pakistani would
assume any position which could be construed as being antiMoscow and anti-Peking.

With SEATO oriented toward an

anti-Chinese stand, Pakistani moves, as evidenced by their
recent statements in SEATO communiques, are a continuation
of this policy of an "understanding" with the Communist
giants.
If it can be accepted that a general rapprochement
is being made, SEATO, as it was conceived, stands in con
flict with such a movement.
Likelihood Number Three:' A "new" American attitude
toward general engagement in the Far East and Southeast Asia
has been given impetus with the several declarations that
President Nixon has made regarding future commitments of
United States resources in this area.

The "Guam Declara

tion" and other statements would lead one to believe that.
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once the United States has extricated itself from Vietnam,
the United States will henceforth revert to a theme of the
"Forties," that of being an arsenal.
If this is to be the American policy, then this also
would have a tendency to de-emphasize the SEATO system.

A

forerunner of this policy might be the report by "American
officials" to the effect that the recent meeting of the
SEATO Council was largely "ritualistic" in nature.29
Likelihood Number Four:

Any "fear" that reliance

on only SEATO commitments might lend an element of danger
to countries in and around the Treaty Area is offset by the
contingency of further bilateral ties to the United States,
and the added emphasis that these might be given.

The

Treaty Area is specified as being in the Asian region.
Such an application is of immediate concern to Thailand on
the Asian mainland, to a lesser degree by Pakistan which has
no common border with either the Soviet Union or mainland
China, and to far lesser degrees by the Philippines,
Australia, and New Zealand, who are insular.
If we assume that because of the division of inter
ests that now dominate the member-units of SEATO any direct
or indirect threat would not find a consensus for action to
be taken, then we can further assume that defense against
an actual attack on a member would not be of major concern
of other units.
29a P dispatch. New York Times, July 4, 1970, p. 1,
col. 8.
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The United States has mutual defense pacts with
several countries on both a bilateral and a collective
basis.

The Thais, in addition to having treaty obligations

with the United States, sought to bolster a firmer commit
ment of the United States to come to the aid of Thailand
in the case of an attack.

This was done through the medium

of the "special understanding and declaration" enunciated
between Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand and
Secretary of State Dean Rusk on March 2, 1962.
Australia and New Zealand both place great confi
dence in their ANZUS pact with the United States.

They also

have close ethnic and linguistic ties to the United States.
The Philippines also has an advantage of previous ties with
this country, and this special relationship has been
constantly reinforced by the various administrations since
the granting of Philippine independence.
Any "fear" that reliance only on SEATO commitments
might endanger the security of these countries is offset by
this contingency of further ties to the United States.
Likelihood Number Five:
remains one of great importance.

The question of security
What condition or setting

that may be in effect today does not necessarily guarantee
its continuance.

With the absence of a security type

orientation in ASEAN, ASPAC, and Colombo, the qualitative
security factor of the already established sub-system of
SEATO could offer an answer to that problem, assuming that
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problem-perception and membership could be altered without
a disruption to the system.

SEATO has as its primary func

tion the generation of a military capability, should the
need arise.

Of secondary importance is the social-economic-

cultural capacity that it now supports.

While such a

supportive role could fulfill an integrative function for
SEATO, it is doubtful that, given other political considera
tions which weigh against it, this would greatly help the
organization.
The extra-regional membership of such an "Asian"
organization grossly outweighs any contributive role.
There has been agitation on the part of Asian powers for
the creation of a strict Asian organization whose membership
would be restricted to only Asian members.

ASA, ASPAC, and

ASEAN (successor to ASA) can be seen as a large step in this
direction.

Thailand, while once the most vocal United

States supporter, has done an almost about-face in this
regard, and makes no secret of her disillusionment with
SEATO.

Thailand was the creative force in ASA and ASEAN,

and from all outward appearances would seem to be a strong
advocate of ASPAC.
Pakistan, in addition to her CENTO ties— which by
her own admission she no longer believes to be of any con
sequence— is merging more and more into an economic
partnership with the ROD— Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey.
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It would seem, therefore, that with these moves now
afoot, the future of SEATO is questionable.

The issue of

security is one that is always present, and given the fact
that the Asian alliances at this time do not provide for
such a collective entity, this could prove to be a positive
factor on the side of SEATO.

If, however, the question of

security is solved on strictly an Asian basis, then a dras
tic change in SEATO goals would have to evolve, if the
organization were to survive.
Likelihood Number Six:

SEATO— according to the

United States understanding appended to the Treaty— was
formed as a defensive vehicle to ". . . apply only to
on

Communist aggression.

..."

Explicitly, this would refer

to overt or open Red Chinese invasion of any of the signa
tory or Protocol powers.

Implicitly--and events lately

would tend to lean this way— a "new" recognizable influence
is seeming to shape itself in regard to interpretive under
standings.

A revised view of the problem of insurgency, as

a type and form of "aggression," is beginning to take form.
A new attitude seems to be developing by the SEATO
powers to the effect that problems of insurgency are "local"
and therefore are the exclusive problem of the state in
which they occur.
If we can accept at face value some of the state
ments of the Red Chinese hierarchy regarding "insurgency"

30Appendix C, p. 134.
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and forms of "national liberation," then it would seem to
follow that new forms of resistance would have to be
developed.

In this context, perhaps the old form of "col

lective" security is archaic and must be replaced by new
concepts.

If this is true, then it follows that internal

stability of the state is a prerequisite to the fashioning
of a.defense against internal disturbances, whether intern
ally or externally organized.
Assistance in peaceful nation-building steps would
seem to be the order of the day.

Rather than expending

large resources on conventional armed forces, a shift to
socio-economic emphasis might realize greater benefits in
the long range period, thereby completely obviating the
necessity for today’s thoughts on collective security.
This is not to say that in developing nations there
is no need for some type of conventional force.

Internal

"policing" is still a requirement that is needed not only
by developing, but by developed nations as well.

But

should external threats be seen as no longer valid, then an
allocation of resources could be shifted to the all impor
tant sector of building up the society and capacity of the
country.
From the evidence at hand, these six conclusions
have been drawn.

At the outset, no claim was made as to

this being an exhaustive review.

The very fact that the

nation-states involved--the United States, Great Britain,
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France, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, and their natural membership in other Subordinate
Systems— precludes such an examination, for it would of
necessity be too wide range and far reaching.

Of necessity,

this review has confined itself to some chosen aspects of
political interaction which occurred between these various
states over a period of time.
Five criteria were envisaged as contributing to the
basic problem involved with SEATO:

first, was the issue of

problem-perception of the member-states, and how they
originally conceived themselves in relationship to the
organization, and their subsequent re-evaluation of that
perception.

Second, the issue created by a necessity of

some of the nations to become more "inward" seeking because
of either a reduction of "power" status, or a demand on the
part of their societies to allocate more available resources
to internal problems, or a combination of both.

Third, the

evolvement of a form of polycentrism whereby natural geo
graphic contiguities form themselves into meaningful Sub
ordinate systems which in turn can be accompanied by cross
purpose demands in any interaction which occur between these
systems.

Also the various members of the respective sys

tems, seeking a position of primacy within those systems,
can increase the number of conflicting demands due to the
very nature of their struggle within that system.

Fourth

is the overlapping issue of the Cold War which is closely
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interwoven in the above but which, because of the two
nations involved and the respective power they have, must
be singled out.

And fifth is the issue of the political

interactions which took place between some of the memberstates and the resultant consequences which followed.
This then was the thesis presented.

Evidence has

been examined, a discussion made of that evidence, and from
that, six probable conclusions have been drawn.

Although

these conclusions are not of an absolute nature, it remains
the feeling of this author that conditions remain too fluid
to do otherwise.

At the same time, I am confident that

these will serve as guidelines by which to observe future
developments in this area.
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APPENDIX A
MEETINGS OF THE SOUTH EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION
1955

February

Bangkok, Thailand

1956

March

Karachi, Pakistan

1957

March

Camberra, Australia

1958

March

Manila, the Philippines

1959

April

Wellington, New Zealand

(September)

Washington, D.C.*

1960

May

Washington, D.C.

1961

March

Bangkok, Thailand

1962

(no formal meeting)

1963

April

Paris, France

1964

April

Manila, the Philippines

1965

May

London, England

1966

June

Camberra, Australia

1967

April

Washington, D.C.

1968

April

Wellington, New Zealand

1969

May

Bangkok, Thailand

19 70

June

Manila, the Philippines

* Special

meeting of the Council of Ministers
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APPENDIX B
ABBREVIATIONS USED
ABD

..........

ANZUS

........

Asian Development Bank
Australia, New Zealand, United States
Security Pact

A S A .......... Association of Southeast Asia
A S E A N ........ Association of Southeast Asia
(successor to ASA)
ASPAC

........

Asian Pacific Council

CENTO

........

Central Treaty Organization

EDO

..........

European Defense Community

EEC

..........

European Economic Community

EFTA ..........

European Free Trade Association

MAPHILINDO . . .

Malaysia, Philippine, Indonesian Pact

NATO ..........

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ROD

Regional Cooperation for Development

..........

SEATO

........

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

UN ............

United Nations

UNICIP

United Nations Commission on India and
Pakistan

. .. .
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APPENDIX C
THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE
TREATY AND THE PACIFIC CHARTER
(Manila, 8 September 195*4)
The Parties to this Treaty,
Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set
forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire
to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments,
Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights
of self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they
will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote
self-government and to secure the independence of all
countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake
its responsibilities.
Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and
to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty
and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being
and development of all peoples in the Treaty Area,
Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of
unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that
the Parties stand together in the area, and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective
defence for the preservation of peace and security.
Therefore agree as follows:
ARTICLE 1.
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which
they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice are not endan
gered, and to refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.
131
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ARTICLE II.
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this
Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will
maintain and develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter
subversive activities directed from without against their
territorial integrity and political stability.
ARTICLE III.
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions
and to cooperate with one another in the further develop
ment of economic measures, including technical assistance,
designed both to promote economic progress and social
well-being and to further the individual and collective
efforts of governments toward these ends.
ARTICLE IV.
1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed
attack in the Treaty Area against any of the Parties or
against any State or territory which the Parties by unani
mous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its
own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event
act to meet the common danger in accordance with its con
stitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the
United Nations.
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviola
bility or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty
of political independence of any Party in the Treaty Area
or of any other State or territory to which the provisions
of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is
threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is
affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might
endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult
immediately in order to agree on the measures which should
be taken for the common defence.
3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any
State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1
of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be
taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the
government concerned.
ARTICLE V.
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of
them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning
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the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall
provide for consultation with regard to military and any
other planning as the situation obtaining in the Treaty
Area may from time to time require. The Council shall be
so organized as to be able to meet at any time.
ARTICLE VI.
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted
as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any
of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or
the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance
of international peace and security. Each Party declares
that none of the international engagements now in force
between it and any other of the Parties or any third party
is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and
undertakes not to enter into any international engagement
in conflict with this Treaty.
ARTICLE VII.
Any other State in a position to further the objectives of
this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area
may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to
accede to this Treaty.
Any State so invited may become a
Party of the Treaty by depositing its instrument of
accession with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.
The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit
of each such instrument of accession.
ARTICLE VIII.
As used in this Treaty, the "Treaty Area" is the general
area of South-East Asia, including also the entire terri
tories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the
South-West Pacific not including the Pacific area north
of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may,
by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within
the Treaty Area the territory of any State acceding to this
Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change
the Treaty Area.
ARTICLE IX.
1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly
certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that
Government to the other signatories.
2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried
out by the Parties in accordance with their respective
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constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification
shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all
of the other signatories of such deposit.
3.
The Treaty shall enter into force between the States
which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of
ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have
been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to
each other State on the date of the deposit of its instru
ment of ratification.
ARTICLE X.
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any
Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice
of denunciation has been given to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the
Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each
notice of denunciation.
ARTICLE XI.
The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties,
but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof
and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and
binding on the Parties.

understanding

of

the u n i t e d

states

of

AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty
does so with the understanding that its recognition of the
effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with
reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to
Communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other
aggression or armed attack it will consult under the pro
visions of Article IV, paragraph 2.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have
signed this Treaty.
Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954*
*Signed for Australia by Richard G. Casey, Minister of
External Affairs; for France by Guy La Chambre, Minister
of State; for New Zealand by T. Clifton Webb, Minister of
External Affairs; for Pakistan by Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrulla
Khan, Foreign Minister; for the Republic of the Philippines
by Carlos P. Garcia, Vice President and Secretary of Foreign
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Affairs, Francisco A. Delgado, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Thomas L. Cahili,
Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada, and Representative Cornelio T.
Villareal; for Thailand by Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun
Naradhip Bongsprabandh, Minister of Foreign Affairs; for
the United States by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State,
Senator H. Alexander Smith, and Senator Michael J. Mansfield.
PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE
DEFENCE TREATY
Designation of states and territory as to which provisions
of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable:
The Parties to the South-East Asia Collective
Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes
of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos
territory under the jurisdiction of the State

Defence
of Article IV
and the free
of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states
and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic
measures contemplated by Article III.
This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with
the coming into force of the Treaty.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have
signed this Protocol to the South-East Asia Collective
Defence Treaty.
Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 19 54.
THE PACIFIC CHARTER
The
the
the
the

delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
United States of America:

Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to
maintain peace and security in South-East Asia and the
South-West Pacific;
Convinced that common action to this end in order to be
worthy and effective, must be inspired by the highest
principles of justice and liberty;
Do hereby proclaim:
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First, in accordance with the provisions of the United
Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly
strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government
and to secure the independence of all countries whose
peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsi
bilities ;
Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective
practical measures to endure conditions favourable to the
orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance
with their constitutional procedures ;
Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic,
social and cultural fields in order to promote higher
living standards, economic progress and social well-being
in this region;
Fourth, as declared in the South-East Asia Collective
Defence Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter
by appropriate means any attempt in the Treaty Area to
subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or
territorial integrity.
Proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September, 19 54.
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